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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper updates Living with Mortality published in 2006. It describes how the longevity risk transfer market 
has developed over the intervening period, and, in particular, how insurance-based solutions – buy-outs, buy-ins 
and longevity insurance – have triumphed over capital markets solutions that were expected to dominate at the 
time. Some capital markets solutions – longevity-spread bonds, longevity swaps, q-forwards, and tail-risk 
protection – have come to market, but the volume of business has been disappointingly low. The reason for this 
is that when market participants compare the index-based solutions of the capital markets with the customized 
solutions of insurance companies in terms of basis risk, credit risk, regulatory capital, collateral, and liquidity, the 
former perform on balance less favourably despite a lower potential cost. We discuss the importance of stochastic 
mortality models for forecasting future longevity and examine some applications of these models, e.g., 
determining the longevity risk premium and estimating regulatory capital relief. The longevity risk transfer market 
is now beginning to recognize that there is insufficient capacity in the insurance and reinsurance industries to deal 
fully with demand and new solutions for attracting capital markets investors are now being examined – such as 
longevity-linked securities and reinsurance sidecars.    
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
1.1.1  A little over a decade ago, the longevity risk transfer market started. This is now a global 
market, but it began in the UK in 2006. To coincide with the setup of this market, the British 
Actuarial Journal published Living with Mortality (Blake et al., 2006a). That paper examined 
the problem of longevity risk – the risk surrounding uncertain aggregate mortality – and 
discussed the ways in which life insurers, annuity providers and pension plans could manage 
their exposure to this risk. In particular, it focused on how they could use mortality-linked 
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securities and over-the-counter contracts – some existing and others still hypothetical – to 
manage their longevity risk exposures. It provided a detailed analysis of two such securities – 
the Swiss Re mortality bond issued in December 2003 and the European Investment Bank 
(EIB)/BNP Paribas longevity bond announced in November 2004. It then looked at the 
universe of hypothetical mortality-linked securities – other forms of longevity bonds, swaps, 
futures and options – and investigated their potential uses. It also addressed implementation 
issues, and drew lessons from the experience with other derivative contracts. Particular 
attention was paid to the issues involved with the construction and use of mortality indices, the 
management of the associated credit risks, and possible barriers to the development of markets 
for these securities. The paper concluded that these implementation difficulties were essentially 
teething problems that would be resolved over time, and so leave the way open to the 
development of a flourishing market in a brand new class of capital market securities.1  
1.1.2  In the event, the EIB/BNP longevity bond did not attract sufficient demand to get 
launched. The Swiss Re mortality bond, known as Vita,2 was followed by broadly similar 
bonds from both Swiss Re and other issuers, but the overall size of the issuance was fairly 
small. Swiss Re also pioneered the successful issuance of a longevity-spread bond, known as 
Kortis,3 but again the size of the issue was small. Investment banks, such as JP Morgan 
and Société Générale, introduced some innovative derivatives contracts – q-forwards and tail 
risk protection – but, so far, only a few of these contracts have been sold.  Overall, then, the 
demand for the capital market solutions that have been proposed for hedging longevity risk has 
been disappointingly low. 
1.1.3  By contrast, the solutions offered by the insurance industry have been much more 
successful. The key examples are the buy-out, the buy-in and longevity insurance. In other 
words, pension plan trustees, sponsors and advisers preferred dealing with risk by means of 
insurance contracts which fully removed the risk concerned and were not yet comfortable with 
capital market hedges that left some residual basis risk. 
1.2 Focus of this Paper 
The present paper provides a review of the developments in longevity risk management over 
the last decade or so. In particular, we focus on the ways in which pension plans and life 
insurers have managed their exposure to longevity risk, on why capital market securities failed 
to take off in the way that was anticipated ten years ago, and what solutions for managing 
longevity risk might become available in the future. 
1.3 Layout of this Paper 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 quantifies the potential size of the longevity risk 
market globally. Section 3 discusses the different stakeholders in the market for longevity risk 
transfers. Sections 4 and 5, respectively, examine the structure of the successful insurance-
based and capital market solutions that have been brought to market since 2006. The distinction 
between index and customized hedges and the issue of basis risk are investigated in Section 6, 
while Section 7 looks at credit risk, regulatory capital and collateral, and Section 8 discusses 
liquidity. Stochastic mortality models are crucial to the design and pricing of longevity risk 
transfer solutions and these are reviewed in Section 9, while some applications that use these 
models are considered in Section 10. Section 11 reviews the developments in the longevity de-
                                                 
1 As originally suggested in Blake and Burrows (2001), Dowd (2003), and Blake et al. 
(2006b). 
2 http://www.artemis.bm/deal_directory/vita-capital-ltd/ 
3 http://www.artemis.bm/deal_directory/kortis-capital-ltd/ 
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risking market since 2006. Section 12 looks at potential future risk transfer solutions that 
involve the capital markets and Section 13 concludes.  
 
2.  QUANTIFYING THE POTENTIAL SIZE OF THE LONGEVITY RISK MARKET 
 
2.1  Michaelson and Mulholland (2015) recently estimated the potential size of the global 
longevity risk market for pension liabilities at between $60trn and $80trn, comprising: 
(i) The accumulated assets of private pension systems in the Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD) were $32.1trn,4 arising from: pension funds (67.9%), 
banks and investment companies (18.5%), insurance companies (12.8%), and employers’ 
book reserves (0.8%) at year-end 2012 (OECD, 2013). 
(ii) The US social security system had unfunded obligations for past and current participants 
of $24.3trn, as of the end of 2013 (Social Security Administration, 2013). 
(iii) The aggregate liability of US State Retirement Systems was an additional $3trn, as of the 
end of 2012 (Morningstar, 2013), which does not capture the liabilities of countless US 
local and municipal pension systems. 
(iv) There are public social security systems in 170 countries (excluding the US) that provide 
old-age benefits of some sort for which reliable size estimates are not readily available but 
which are certainly substantial.5   
 
2.2  Michaelson and Mulholland (2015) then estimated the size of the longevity risk underlying 
these liabilities. Each additional year of unanticipated life expectancy at age 65 – roughly 
equivalent to a 0.8% increase in mortality improvements or a 13% reduction in mortality 
rates6– can increase pension liabilities by 4%–5%7 (Swiss Re Europe, 2012). Risk Management 
Solutions (RMS) estimated the standard deviation of a sustained shock to annual mortality 
improvements (lasting 10 years or more) relative to expectations at around 0.80%. Michaelson 
and Mulholland use this estimate to calculate the effect of a longevity tail event (i.e., a 2.5 
standard deviation event) which corresponds to a 2% change in trend (0.80% × 2.5 = 2%) and, 
in turn, implies that longevity-related liabilities could increase by 10%–12.5% as a result of 
unforeseen mortality improvements. Given aggregate global pension liabilities of $60–80trn, 
these could, in the extreme, turn out to be between $6trn and 10trn higher.  
 
2.3   Pigott and Walker (2016) also estimate that private sector longevity risk exposure is of 
the order of $30trn.8  This is concentrated in the US ($14.460trn), the UK ($2.685trn), Australia 
($1.639trn), Canada ($1.298trn), Holland ($1.282trn), Japan ($1.221trn), Switzerland 
($0.788trn), South Africa ($0.306trn), France ($0.272trn), South America ($0.251trn), 
Germany ($0.236trn) and Hong Kong ($0.110trn).  Pigott and Walker argue that only the UK, 
US, Canada and Holland currently have the conditions for a longevity risk transfer market to 
develop. These conditions include: low interest rates (in part due to government quantitative 
easing programmes in response to the 2007-08 Global Financial Crisis (GFC)) which, by 
increasing the present value of more distant pension payments, has exposed the real extent of 
longevity risk in pension plans; inflation uplifting of pensions in payment further increases 
longevity risk; frequent updating by the actuarial profession of longevity projections; the 
introduction of market-consistent valuation methods; increased accounting transparency of 
                                                 
4 Revised to $38trn at the end of 2016 (OECD(2017) Global Pension Statistics). 
5 Social Security Administration: http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/ 
6 Own calculations, based on England & Wales mortality forecasts for males aged 65. 
7 Corresponding to 2% and 0% real discount rates, respectively. 
8 Derived from Aon Hewitt calculations, based on data from the OECD and European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA). 
 4 
pension assets and liabilities; and increased intervention powers by the regulator.  Collectively, 
these factors have focussed the minds of plan trustees and sponsors and encouraged them to 
look for solutions with their advisers. 
 
2.4   The other markets do not currently have the right conditions for the following reasons: 
• Australia: Most sponsors of pension plans bear little or no longevity risk; individuals 
often take a lump sum or buy term (20-year) annuities at retirement, then rely on the 
state, although a lifetime annuity market is beginning to emerge. 
• Japan: Corporate sponsors of pension plans and insurers do not bear longevity risk, 
since individuals buy term annuities at retirement; however, there is a growing market 
for long-term annuities in Japan purchased from Australia.9 
• Switzerland: Individuals are incentivized but not required to annuitize; the market is 
small, but may open up in the future. 
• Germany: Occupational plan liabilities are often written onto company balance sheets 
as book reserves, so there is little resource or incentive to de-risk, despite longevity risk 
being as significant a risk as it is in other countries. 
• France: A very small market, although French insurers and reinsurers are active in other 
markets.   
• South Africa and South America: Hampered by lack of or unreliable historical mortality 
data and poor experience data; in Chile, which has a rapidly growing lifetime annuities 
market, the government effectively underwrites annuity providers which therefore have 
no incentive to hedge their longevity risk exposure.10 
 
3.  STAKEHOLDERS IN THE LONGEVITY RISK TRANSFER MARKET  
 
3.1 Classes of Stakeholders 
Figure 1 shows the participants in the longevity risk transfer market. In this section, we examine 
the various classes of stakeholders in this market. 
3.2 Hedgers 
3.2.1  One natural class of stakeholders are hedgers, those who have a particular exposure to 
longevity risk and wish to lay off that risk. For example, defined benefit pension funds and 
annuity providers stand to lose if mortality improves by more than anticipated, whilst life 
insurance companies stand to gain, and vice versa. These offsetting exposures imply that 
annuity providers and life assurers, for example, can hedge each other’s longevity risks.11 
Alternatively, parties with unwanted exposure to longevity risk might pay other parties to lay 
off some of their risk. For instance, a life office might hedge its longevity risk using a reinsurer 
or by selling it to capital market institutions.  
 
                                                 
9 Richard Gluyas (2017) Challenger rides tidal wave of Japanese interest in Australian 
annuities, The Weekend Australian, 24 April: ‘sales of Australian dollar annuities in Japan 
are estimated to be worth about $A30 billion a year — about seven times the size of the 
entire annuities market in Australia’. 
10 See Zelenko (2014) 
11 In many cases, annuity providers and life assurers are part of the same life office, in 
which case the annuity and life books provide at least a partial ‘natural hedge’. 
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Figure 1: Participants in the Longevity Risk Transfer Market  
 
 
Source: Adapted from Loeys et al. (2007, Chart 10); PPF = Pension Protection Fund, PBGC = 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 
 
3.2.2   As another possibility, pharmaceutical companies benefit if people live longer, since 
they (and the health service) need to spend more on medicines as they get older, especially for 
those in poor health. Also there is a continuous stream of new medical treatments that prolong 
life. The pharmaceutical companies could potentially issue longevity-linked debt to finance 
their research and development programmes which, if sufficiently attractive for pension funds 
to hold, could be issued at a lower cost than conventional fixed maturity debt. In other words, 
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pharmaceutical companies benefit if longevity increases and could put on a counterbalancing 
position by issuing longevity bonds.12 While they have been approached about this possibility, 
no pharmaceutical company has yet issued such debt. The principal reasons appear to be that 
the finance directors have not been made sufficiently aware of the potential benefits of such an 
issue – and in any case are more concerned that the millions of dollars being spent on drug 
trials will bring a sufficient return to shareholders – and because, in practice, the short-term 
correlation between company profits and longevity is probably not strong enough to persuade 
finance directors to issue longevity bonds.  
3.3 Specialist and General Investors 
There are specialist investors in this market, such as life settlement13 investors, premium 
finance investors,14 and insurance-linked securities (ILS) investors.15 Depending on their 
existing exposures, these investors could either buy longevity protection or sell it and earn a 
premium. General investors include short-term investors, such as hedge funds and private 
equity investors, and long-term investors, such as sovereign wealth funds, endowments, and 
family offices. Provided expected returns are acceptable, such investors might be interested in 
acquiring an exposure to longevity risk, since it has a low correlation with standard financial 
market risk factors. The combination of a low beta and a potentially positive alpha should 
therefore make mortality-linked securities attractive investments in diversified portfolios.   
3.4 Speculators and Arbitrageurs 
A market in longevity-linked securities might attract speculators: short-term investors who 
trade their views on the direction of individual security price movements. The active 
involvement of speculators is important for creating market liquidity as a by-product of their 
trading activities, and is in fact essential to the success of traded futures and options markets. 
However, liquidity also depends on the frequency with which new information about the 
market materializes and this is currently sufficiently low that there is negligible speculator 
interest in the longevity market at the present time. Arbitrageurs seek to profit from any pricing 
anomalies in related securities. For arbitrage to be a successful activity, it is essential that there 
are well-established pricing relationships between the related securities: periodically, prices get 
out of line which creates profit opportunities which arbitrageurs exploit.16 However, the 
longevity market is currently not sufficiently well developed for arbitrage opportunities to 
exist. 
                                                 
12 This possibility was first suggested in Dowd (2003). 
13 A life settlement is the US name for a traded life policy. 
14 Premium finance investors provide funding for those wishing to buy life settlements and 
similar types of policies. 
15 Insurance-linked securities are financial instruments whose values depend typically on 
the occurrence of prescribed high severity, low probability insurance loss events. The 
typical events covered are natural catastrophes, such hurricanes and earthquakes, and 
the values of the ILSs will depend on the value of the property losses if such events occur. 
ILSs are commonly known as catastrophe or CAT bonds. 
16 Classic examples are currencies and commodities, such as gold, which are traded in two 
different markets at different prices.  Arbitrageurs will buy in the cheaper market and 
immediately sell in the dearer market, making an arbitrage profit if the price difference 
exceeds any transaction costs.  The key difference between arbitrageurs and speculators 
is that the former seek to make a profit without taking on any risks (or at least minimizing 
the risks they need to take), whereas the latter seek to make a profit from explicitly 
assuming risks. 
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3.5 Governments  
3.5.1  Governments have many potential reasons to be interested in markets for longevity-
linked securities. They might wish to promote such markets and assist financial institutions that 
are exposed to longevity risk (e.g., they might issue longevity bonds that can be used as 
instruments to hedge longevity risk).17  
 
3.5.2   Governments might also be interested in managing their own exposure to longevity risk. 
They are a significant holder of this risk in their own right via pay-as-you-go state pensions, 
pensions to former public sector employees and their obligations to provide health care for the 
elderly. At a higher level, governments are affected by numerous other economic factors, some 
of which partially offset their own exposure to longevity risk (for example, income tax on 
private pensions in payment continues to be paid as people live longer).  
3.6 Regulators  
3.6.1 Financial regulators have two main stated aims: (i) the enhancement of financial stability 
through the promotion of efficient, orderly and fair markets, and (ii) ensuring that retail 
customers get a fair deal.18 The two financial regulators in the UK responsible for delivering 
on these aims are the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) and the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA).  
 
3.6.2 The PRA has a duty to ensure that the financial system is protected against systemic risks, 
and longevity risk is a potential example of such a risk. This, in turn, requires that carriers of 
such risks, such as life insurance companies, issue sufficient regulatory capital to protect 
themselves from insolvency with a high degree of probability. The FCA’s duty is to ensure that 
customers get competitive and fairly priced annuity products, for example, and that becomes 
more difficult if providers of these products cannot easily or economically hedge the longevity 
risk contained in them.19 
 
3.6.3 Another interested regulator is The Pensions Regulator (TPR) which acts as gatekeeper 
to the UK’s pension lifeboat, the Pension Protection Fund (PPF).20 TPR wants to reduce the 
probability that large companies (in particular) are bankrupted by their pension funds (Harrison 
and Blake, 2016). As ‘insurer of last resort’, the Government is also potentially the residual 
holder of this risk in the event of default by the PPF. The PPF and Government have a strong 
incentive to help companies hedge their exposure to longevity risk, which would reduce the 
likelihood of claims on the PPF. The PPF faces the systematic risk that longevity projections 
go up generally for plans (without diversifying away between plans), which (i) pushes some 
plans into the PPF and (ii) increases existing PPF liabilities.21  
                                                 
17 As proposed in Blake et al. (2014). 
18 As specified in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. 
19 Hedging allows the issuer of an annuity to reduce its exposure to longevity risk which 
in turn allows it to offer its products at more competitive prices (i.e., closer to the 
actuarially fair price), since less regulatory capital needs to be posted.  
20 A statutory fund established by the UK Pensions Act 2004 ‘to provide compensation to 
members of eligible defined benefit pension plans, when there is a qualifying insolvency 
event in relation to the employer, and where there are insufficient assets in the pension 
plan to cover the Pension Protection Fund level of compensation’. Another example is the 
US Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). 
21 The same would apply, mutatis mutandis, to the US equivalent of the PPF, namely the 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). 
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3.7 Other Stakeholders 
Other domestic stakeholders include healthcare providers and insurers, providers of equity 
release (or reverse or lifetime) mortgages, and securities managers and organized exchanges, 
all of which would benefit from a new source of fee income. Members of both defined benefit 
(DB) and defined contribution (DC) plans have an interest in protecting their current and future 
pension entitlements, although the risks in the two types of plan are different. In the case of 
DB, the security of the plan itself is at stake, with the member facing the risk of lower (e.g., 
PPF) benefits if the plan sponsor becomes insolvent. In the case of DC, the member is exposed 
either to the vagaries of the individual annuities market or to the risk of drawing down benefits 
too quickly and surviving longer than expected. Finally, individuals with state pensions are 
ultimately not immune from increases in the government’s budget deficit that arise from 
increases in life expectancy: (i) state pensions could fall (in real terms) for current pensioners, 
(ii) the state pension age could increase even further than currently planned for future 
pensioners, and (iii) all current and future generations of tax payers are ultimately liable for the 
increased cost. Longevity risk is a global phenomenon, so there will be similar stakeholders in 
other countries where this problem is prevalent.  
 
4.   SUCCESSFUL INSURANCE-BASED SOLUTIONS 
4.1   Overview 
The traditional solution for dealing with unwanted longevity risk in a DB pension plan or an 
annuity book is to sell the liability via an insurance or reinsurance contract. This is known as a 
pension buy-out (or pension termination) or, in an insurance context, a group/bulk annuity 
transfer. More recently, pension buy-ins and longevity insurance (the insurance term for a 
longevity swap) have been added to the list of insurance-based solutions for transferring 
longevity risk. Insurance solutions are generally classified as ‘customized indemnification 
solutions’, since the insurer fully indemnifies the hedger against its specific risk exposure. 
These solutions can also be thought of as ‘at-the-money’ hedges, since the hedge provider is 
responsible for any increase in the liability above the current best estimate assumption on a 
pound-for-pound basis. 
4.2   Pension Buy-outs 
4.2.1   The most common traditional solution for DB pension plans is a full pension buy-out, 
implemented by a regulated life assurer. The procedure can be illustrated using the following 
simple example.  
 
4.2.2   Consider Company ABC with pension plan assets (A) of 85 and pension plan liabilities 
(L) of 100, valued on an ‘ongoing basis’22 by the plan actuary; this implies a deficit of 15. ABC 
approaches life assurer XYZ to effect a pension buy-out. On a full ‘buy-out basis’, the insurer 
values the pension liabilities at 120, a premium of 20 to the plan actuary’s valuation, implying 
a buy-out deficit of 35. The insurer, subject to due diligence, offers to take on both the plan 
assets A and plan liabilities L provided the company contributes 35 from its own resources (or 
from borrowing) to cover the buy-out deficit. Following the acquisition, the insurer implements 
an asset transition plan which involves exchanging certain assets, e.g., cash or equities for 
                                                 
22 In the UK, this would be consistent with Section 28 of FRS 102 (The Financial Reporting 
Standard applicable in the UK and Republic of Ireland) or the International Accounting 
Standard IAS 19. 
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bonds or loans, and implementing interest rate and inflation swaps to hedge the interest-rate 
and inflation risk associated with the pension liabilities.23 
 
4.2.3   The advantages to the company are that the pension liabilities are completely removed 
from its balance sheet. In the case where the company does not have the cash resources to pay 
the full cost of the buy-out, the pension deficit (on a buy-out basis) is often replaced by a loan 
which, unlike fluctuating pension liabilities, is an obligation that is readily understood by 
investment analysts and shareholders. The company avoids volatility in its profit and loss 
account coming from the pension plan,24 the payment of levies to the PPF, administration fees 
on the plan and the potential drag on its enterprise value arising from the pension plan. The 
advantage of a buy-out to the pension trustees and plan members is that pensions are now 
secured in full (subject to the credit risk of the life assurer).  
 
4.2.4   There is a potential disadvantage in terms of timing. Once a buy-out has taken place, it 
cannot generally be renegotiated if circumstances change and the buy-out price is lower in the 
future, say, because an increase in long-term interest rates leads to the discount rate used to 
value pension liabilities also increasing. There is also a potential risk that the buy-out company 
itself becomes insolvent in which case the pensioners would have no recourse to the PPF. 
However, since buy-out companies are established as insurance companies with solvency 
capital requirements,25 this risk should, in practice, be very low in countries like the UK. 
4.3   Pension Buy-ins 
4.3.1   Buy-ins are insurance transactions that involve the bulk purchase of annuities by the 
pension plan to hedge the risks associated with a subset of the plan’s liabilities, typically 
associated with retired members. The annuities become an asset of the plan and cover the 
specific mortality characteristics of the plan’s membership in terms of age, gender and pension 
amount – but the individual members do not receive annuity certificates.  
 
4.3.2   Buy-ins are often part of the journey to a full buy-out. They can be thought of as 
providing a ‘de-risking’ of the pension plan in economic terms. If purchased in phases, they 
enable the plan to smooth out annuity rates over time and avoid a spike in pricing at the time it 
decides to proceed directly to a full buy-out. Buy-ins also offer the sponsor the advantage of 
full immunization of a portion of the pension liabilities for a lower up-front cash payment 
relative to a full buy-out – although the recent introduction of deferred premium payments for 
both buy-ins and buy-outs has helped to spread costs for both types of product.26  
 
                                                 
23 Traditional UK insurers running annuity books interpret UK regulatory capital 
requirements as restricting them to invest in government and investment-grade corporate 
bonds and related derivatives. 
24 This volatility is generated by the way in which accounting standards treat DB pension 
liabilities in a market-consistent way as the present discounted value of projected future 
pension payments. The required discount rates are related to the market yield on a class 
of traded bonds (such as AA-rated corporate bonds) of appropriate term. If market 
conditions are such that this yield is volatile, then the value of the pension liabilities will 
be similarly volatile, even though the projected stream of future pension payments might 
have changed very little. Further, if the loan has a shorter duration than the pension 
cashflows, it will have a lower balance sheet sensitivity to interest rate changes. 
25 See Section 7.2 for more details. 
26 See paragraph 11.52. 
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4.3.3    Since the annuity contract purchased in a buy-in is an asset of the pension plan, rather 
than an asset of the plan member, the pension liability remains on the balance sheet of the 
sponsor. Plan members are therefore still exposed to the risk of sponsor insolvency if the plan 
is in deficit and (indirectly) to the risk of insurance company insolvency unless the buy-in deal 
has been fully collateralized.  
4.4   Longevity Insurance or Insurance-based Longevity Swaps 
4.4.1   The third successful solution is the longevity insurance contract or insurance-based 
longevity swap. This is effectively an insurance version of the capital-markets-based longevity 
swap (discussed in the next section), which transfers longevity risk only.27 A typical structure 
involves the buyer of the swap paying a pre-agreed fixed set of cash flows to the swap provider 
and receiving in exchange a floating set of cash flows linked to the realized mortality 
experience of the swap buyer, the latter being used to pay the pensions for which the swap 
buyer is liable. No assets are transferred and the pension plan typically retains the investment 
risks associated with the asset portfolio. Longevity swaps have the advantage that they remove 
longevity risk without the need for an upfront payment by the sponsor and allow the pension 
plan trustees to retain control of the asset allocation.  
 
4.4.2   The first publicly announced longevity swap took place in April 2007 between Swiss 
Re and Friends’ Provident, a UK life insurer. It was a pure longevity risk transfer and was not 
tied to another financial instrument or transaction. The swap was based on Friends’ Provident’s 
£1.7bn book of 78,000 of pension annuity contracts written between July 2001 and December 
2006. Friends’ Provident retains administration of policies. Swiss Re makes payments and 
assumes longevity risk in exchange for an undisclosed premium.  
 
4.4.3   In any longevity swap, the hedger of longevity risk (e.g., a pension plan or insurer) 
receives from the longevity swap provider the actual payments28 it must pay to pensioners and, 
in return, makes a series of fixed payments to the hedge provider.29 In this way, if pensioners 
live longer than expected, the higher pension amounts that the pension plan must pay are offset 
by the higher payments received from the provider of the longevity swap. The swap therefore 
provides the pension plan with a long-maturity, customized cash flow hedge of its longevity 
risk. 
 
                                                 
27 It is important to note that contingent beneficiaries would also be covered by the swap 
and so marital status and spouse age risks would be passed on. Additional data on these 
would be sought at the time of seeking cover, e.g., by writing to members and asking 
them if they are married and, if so, the age of the spouse. But divorce and remarriage can 
still occur before the spouse pension comes into payment. 
28 Before the swap is implemented, it is common to simplify benefits where possible, e.g., 
by reducing the overall number of pension increase tranches, simplifying partial payments 
in month of death, and, in a UK context, simplifying what happens when the pensioner 
passes GMP age. (Between April 1978 and April 1997, members of UK contracted-out 
pension plans accrued a notional SERPS (State Earnings Related Pension Scheme) pension 
which is called the Guaranteed Minimum Pension (GMP). The GMP was originally payable 
from age 60 for women and age 65 for men, although European Union equality legislation 
requires plans to introduce equal treatment for men and women in their plans in respect 
of the GMP.) 
29 It is possible that the swap is set up to cover inflation increases (possibly up to a limit), 
in which case the fixed payments are fixed in real rather than in nominal terms. 
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4.4.4   Figure 2 shows the set of cash flows in a typical longevity swap involving a pension 
plan wishing to hedge its longevity risk exposure. The plan makes a set of pre-agreed fixed 
payments (each payment is based on an amount-weighted survival rate (Dowd et al., 2006, and 
Dawson et al., 2010)) and receives the actual pension payments it needs to make (these will be 
based on its realized longevity experience).  
 
Figure 2: A Longevity Swap Involves the Regular Exchange of  
Actual Realized Pension Cash Flows and Pre-Agreed Fixed Cash Flows 
 
Source: Coughlan et al. (2007a) 
 
5.  SUCCESSFUL CAPITAL MARKETS SOLUTIONS 
5.1   Overview 
In this section, we analyse the small number of capital market securities that have been 
successfully launched since 2006: longevity-spread bonds, longevity swaps, q-forwards, S-
forwards and tail-risk protection (or longevity bull call spreads). The key feature of these is 
that most are index rather than customized solutions.30 
5.2   Longevity-spread Bonds 
5.2.1   In December 2010, Swiss Re issued an eight-year catastrophe-type bond linked to 
longevity spreads. To do this, it used a special purpose vehicle, Kortis Capital, based in the 
Cayman Islands.31 The Kortis bond is designed to hedge Swiss Re's own exposure to longevity 
                                                 
30 The J.P. Morgan–Canada Life swap discussed in Section 5.3 is one of the few examples 
of a customized capital markets solution. 
31 
http://www.swissre.com/media/news_releases/Swiss_Re_completes_first_longevity_tren
d_bond_transferring_USD_50_million_of_longevity_trend_risk_to_the_capital_markets.h
tml 
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risk.32 It had a very small nominal value of just $50m which clearly meant that it was designed 
to test the water for a new type of capital market instrument.  
5.2.2   The bond holders received quarterly coupons equal to three-month LIBOR plus a 
margin. In exchange, they were exposed to the risk that the difference between the annualized 
mortality improvement in English & Welsh males aged 75 to 85 over a period of eight years 
and the corresponding improvement in US males aged 55 to 65 is significantly larger than 
anticipated. The mortality improvements were measured over eight years from 1 January 2009 
to 31 December 2016. The bonds matured on 15 January 2017,33 although there was an option 
to extend the maturity to 15 July 2019. The principal was at risk if the Longevity Divergence 
Index Value (LDIV) exceeded the attachment point or trigger level of 3.4% over the risk period. 
The exhaustion point, at or above which there would be no return of principal, is 3.9%. The 
principal would be reduced by the principal reduction factor (PRF) if the LDIV lies between 
3.4% and 3.9%. 
5.2.3   The LDIV is derived as follows. Let ( ),ym x t  be the male death rate at age x and year t 
in country y. This is defined as the ratio of deaths to population size for the relevant age and 
year. Annualized mortality improvements over n years are defined as: 
 ( ) ( )( )
1
,
, 1
,
y n
y
n y
m x t
Improvement x t
m x t n
 
= −  
− 
. (1) 
The annualized mortality improvement index for each age group is found by averaging the 
annualized mortality improvements across ages 𝑥𝑥1 to 𝑥𝑥2 in the group: 
                               ( ) ( )
2
12 1
1 ,
1
x x
y
n
x x
Index y Improvement x t
x x
=
=
=
+ − ∑ .                         (2) 
In the case of the Kortis bond, n is equal to 8 years. The LDIV is defined as: 
                                           ( ) ( )2 1LDIV Index y Index y= −                                       (3) 
where 2y is the England & Wales population aged 75-85 and 1y is the US population aged 55-
65. The PRF is calculated as follows: 
                                
LDIV Attachment pointPRF
Exhaustion point Attachment point
−
=
−
,                       (4) 
with a minimum of 0% and a maximum of 100%. 
5.2.4   Proceeds from the sale of the bond were deposited in a collateral account at the AAA-
rated International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (i.e., the World Bank). If there 
is a larger-than-expected difference between the mortality improvements of 75-85 year old 
English & Welsh males and those of 55-65 year old US males, part of the collateral will be 
sold to make payment to Swiss Re and, as a consequence, the principal of the bond would be 
reduced. The exposure that Swiss Re wished to hedge comes from two different sources. For 
example, Swiss Re is the counterparty in a £750m longevity swap with the Royal County of 
                                                 
32 It is important to recognize that the Kortis bond is not a true longevity bond in the sense 
that it hedges the longevity trend in a particular population. Rather it transfers the risk 
associated with the spread (or difference) between the longevity trends for two different 
population groups, rather than the trends themselves. 
33 The payoff of the bond depends on population mortality data for 2016 for England & 
Wales (now published) and the US (not yet published at the time of writing). 
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Berkshire Pension Fund which was executed in 2009, and so is exposed to high-age English & 
Welsh males living longer than anticipated. It has also reinsured a lot of US life insurance 
policies and is exposed to middle-aged US males dying sooner than expected. The longevity-
spread bond provided a partial hedge for both tail exposures. 
5.2.5   Standard & Poor’s rated the bond BB+ which took into account the possibility that 
investors would not receive the full return of their principal. This rating was determined using 
two models developed by RMS which was appointed as the calculation agent for the bonds.34  
5.2.6   Table 1 shows estimated loss probabilities for the bond using the RMS models. Figure 
3 presents a fan chart of the projected LDIV showing the 98% confidence interval. 
 
 
Table 1: Estimated Loss Probabilities for the Swiss Re Longevity-Spread Bond 
 
LDIV PRF Exceedance probability 
3.4% 0% 5.31%(1) 
3.5% 20% 4.32% 
3.6% 40% 3.48% 
3.7% 60% 2.82% 
3.8% 80% 2.28% 
3.9% 100% 1.81%(2) 
   
Expected loss 3.27%  
Note: (1) attachment probability, (2) exhaustion probability 
Source: Standard & Poor’s (2010) Presale information: Kortis Capital Ltd. Tech. Report 
 
 
Figure 3: Fan Chart of the Projected LDIV Showing the 98% Confidence Interval 
 
Source: Hunt and Blake (2015, Figure 8) 
                                                 
34 See Section 9.4 for more details. 
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5.2.7   This was the first time that the risk of individuals living longer than expected has been 
traded in the form of a bond. Investors had been reluctant to hold longevity risk long term, but 
short-term bonds might make bearing the risk more acceptable. The bond therefore represented 
a significant breakthrough for capital market solutions. Nevertheless, there appears to have 
been very little trading in the bond and no further examples of the bond have so far been issued. 
5.3   Capital-markets-based Longevity Swaps 
 
5.3.1   The first capital-markets-based longevity swap took place in July 2008 between J.P. 
Morgan and Canada Life in the UK (Trading Risk, 2008). The contract was a 40-year maturity 
£500m longevity swap that was linked to the actual mortality experience of the 125,000-plus 
annuitants in the annuity portfolio that was being hedged. This transaction brought capital 
markets investors into the longevity market for the very first time, as the longevity risk was 
passed from Canada Life to J.P. Morgan and then directly on to investors.  
 
5.3.2   This has become the archetypal longevity swap upon which other transactions are based. 
Insurance companies, such as Rothesay Life, have adapted its structure and collateralization 
terms to an insurance format.  
 
5.3.3   It is important to note that the J.P. Morgan – Canada Life swap was a customized swap, 
since it was linked to the actual mortality experience of the hedger. All insurance-based 
longevity swaps in the UK have also been customized swaps to date. However, such swaps are 
harder to price35 and are potentially more illiquid than index-based swaps which are based on 
the mortality experience of a reference population, such as the national population. Most 
longevity swaps sold into the capital markets are index-based. These issues are discussed in 
more detail in Section 8. 
5.4   q-Forwards (or Mortality Forwards) and S-Forwards (or Survivor Forwards) 
5.4.1   A mortality forward rate contract is referred to as a ‘q-forward’ because the letter ‘q’ is 
the standard actuarial symbol for a mortality rate. It is the simplest type of instrument for 
hedging longevity (and mortality) risk (Coughlan et al., 2007b).36, 37  
5.4.2   The first capital markets transaction involving a q-forward took place in January 2008. 
The hedger was buy-out company Lucida (Lucida, 2008; Symmons, 2008). The q-forward was 
linked to a longevity index based on England & Wales national male mortality for a range of 
different ages.  The hedge was provided by J.P. Morgan and was novel not just because it 
involved a longevity index and a new kind of product, but also because it was designed as a 
hedge of value rather than a hedge of cash flow. In other words, it hedged the value of an 
annuity liability,38 not the actual individual annuity payments. 
                                                 
35 Although pension plans tend to have good quality data in terms of pension amount, birth 
date, postcode etc, they also tend to have less mortality experience data and have their 
own idiosyncratic socio-economic and geodemographic characteristics that need careful 
assessment and calibration. 
36 See also: http://www.llma.org/files/documents/Technical_Note_q_Forward_Final.pdf; 
http://www.llma.org/files/documents/SampleTermSheet_-_q-Forward_Final.pdf; 
http://www.llma.org/files/documents/q-forward_Example_Sheet_Version_Update.xlsm 
37 Although q-forwards are simple in concept, using them can be complex and multi-
population modelling is essential (see paragraph 9.3.1). 
38 Or a significant part of it, if not fully. 
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5.4.3   Formally, a q-forward is a contract between two parties in which they agree to exchange 
an amount proportional to the actual realized mortality rate of a given population (or sub-
population), in return for an amount proportional to a fixed mortality rate that has been mutually 
agreed at inception to be payable at a future date (the maturity of the contract). In this sense, a 
q-forward is a swap that exchanges fixed mortality for the realized mortality at maturity, as 
illustrated in Figure 4. The variable used to settle the contract is the realized mortality rate for 
that population in a future period. In the case of hedging longevity risk in a pension plan using 
a q-forward, the plan will receive the fixed mortality rate and pay the realized mortality rate 
(and hence, over the term of the contract, locks in the future mortality rate it has to pay whatever 
happens to actual rates). The counterparty to this transaction, typically an investment bank, has 
the opposite exposure, paying the fixed mortality rate and receiving the realized rate. 
 
 
Figure 4: A q-Forward Exchanges Fixed Mortality for Realized Mortality 
at the Maturity of the Contract 
 
 
5.4.4   The fixed mortality rate at which the transaction takes place defines the ‘forward 
mortality rate’ for the population in question. If the q-forward is fairly priced, no payment 
changes hands at the inception of the trade, but at maturity, a net payment will be made by one 
of the two parties (unless the fixed and actual mortality rates happen to be the same). The 
settlement that takes place at maturity is based on the net amount payable and is proportional 
to the difference between the fixed mortality rate (the transacted forward rate) and the realized 
reference rate. If the reference rate in the reference year is below the fixed rate (implying lower 
mortality than predicted), then the settlement is positive, and the pension plan receives the 
settlement payment to offset the increase in its liability value. If, on the other hand, the 
reference rate is above the fixed rate (implying higher mortality than predicted), then the 
settlement is negative and the pension plan makes the settlement payment to the hedge 
provider, which will be offset by the fall in the value of its liabilities. In this way, the net 
liability value is hedged39 regardless of what happens to mortality rates. The plan is protected 
from unexpected changes in mortality rates. 
 
5.4.5   Table 2 presents an illustrative term sheet for a q-forward transaction, based on a 
reference population of 65-year-old males from England & Wales. The q-forward payout 
depends on the value of the LifeMetrics Index for the reference population on the maturity date 
of the contract. The particular transaction shown is a 10-year q-forward contract starting on 31 
December 2008 and maturing on 31 December 2018. It is being used by ABC Pension Fund to 
hedge its longevity risk over this period; the hedge provider is J. P. Morgan. The hedge is a 
                                                 
39 Or a significant part of it, if not fully. 
Pension 
Plan 
Hedge  
Provider 
Amount  x 
realized mortality rate 
Amount  x 
fixed mortality rate 
Source: Coughlan et al. (2007b, Figure 1) 
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‘directional hedge’ and will help the pension fund hedge its longevity risk so long as the 
mortality experience of the pension fund and the index change in the same direction. 
 
5.4.6   On the maturity date, J. P. Morgan (the fixed-rate payer or seller of longevity risk 
protection) pays ABC Pension Fund (the floating-rate payer or buyer of longevity risk 
protection) an amount related to the pre-agreed fixed mortality rate of 1.2000 percent (i.e., the 
agreed forward mortality rate for 65-year-old English & Welsh males for 2018). In return, ABC 
Pension Fund pays J. P. Morgan an amount related to the reference rate on the maturity date. 
The reference rate is the most recently available value of the LifeMetrics Index. Settlement on 
31 December 2018 will therefore be based on the LifeMetrics Index value for the reference 
year 2017, on account of the ten-month lag in the availability of official data. The settlement 
amount is the difference between the fixed amount (which depends on the agreed forward rate) 
and the floating amount (which depends on the realized reference rate).  
 
 
Table 2: An Illustrative Term Sheet for a Single q-forward to Hedge Longevity Risk 
Notional amount GBP 50,000,000 
Trade date 31 Dec 2008 
Effective date 31 Dec 2008 
Maturity date 31 Dec 2018 
Reference year 2017 
Fixed rate 1.2000% 
Fixed amount payer J. P. Morgan 
Fixed amount  Notional Amount x Fixed Rate x 100 
Reference rate LifeMetrics graduated initial mortality rate for 65-year-
old males in the reference year for England & Wales 
national population 
Bloomberg ticker: LMQMEW65 Index <GO> 
Floating amount 
payer 
ABC Pension Fund 
Floating amount  Notional Amount x Reference Rate x 100 
Settlement Net settlement = Fixed amount – Floating amount 
 
Source: Coughlan et al. (2007b, Table 1) 
 
 
5.4.7   Table 3 shows the settlement amounts for four realized values of the reference rate and 
a notional contract size of £50m. If the reference rate in 2017 is lower than the fixed rate 
(implying lower mortality than anticipated at the start of the contract), the settlement amount 
is positive and ABC Pension Fund receives a payment from J. P. Morgan that it can use to 
offset an increase in its pension liabilities. If the reference rate exceeds the fixed rate (implying 
higher mortality than anticipated at the start of the contract), the settlement amount is negative 
and ABC Pension Fund makes a payment to J. P. Morgan which will be offset by a fall in its 
pension liabilities.  
 
Table 3: An Illustration of q-Forward Settlement for 
Various Outcomes of the Realized Reference Rate 
 
Reference rate 
(Realized rate) 
Fixed rate Notional 
(GBP) 
Settlement 
(GBP) 
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1.0000% 1.2000% 50,000,000 10,000,000 
1.1000% 1.2000% 50,000,000 5,000,000 
1.2000% 1.2000% 50,000,000 0 
1.3000% 1.2000% 50,000,000 -5,000,000 
 
Source: Coughlan et al. (2007b, Table 1): A positive (negative) settlement means the hedger pays 
(receives) the net settlement amount 
 
 
5.4.8   It is important to note that the hedge illustrated here is structured as a ‘value hedge’, 
rather than as a ‘cash flow hedge’. A value hedge aims to hedge the value of the hedger’s 
liabilities at the maturity date of the swap. So although the swap has a duration of only 10 years, 
it nevertheless hedges that portion of the longevity risk in the hedger’s cash flows beyond 10 
years that are reflected in mortality rates at time 10. This is achieved by exchanging a single 
payment at maturity. By contrast, a cash flow hedge hedges the longevity risk in each one of 
the hedger’s cash flows and net payments are made period by period as in Figure 2. The J. P. 
Morgan-Canada Life longevity swap is an example of a cash flow hedge, while the J. P. 
Morgan-Lucida q-forward is an example of a value hedge.  The capital markets are more 
familiar with value hedges, whereas cash flow hedges are more common in the insurance world. 
Value hedges are particularly suited to hedging the longevity risk of younger members of a 
pension plan, since it is much harder to estimate with precision the pension payments they will 
receive when they eventually retire. The world’s first swap for non-pensioners (i.e., involving 
deferred members) took place in January 2011 when J. P. Morgan executed a value hedge in 
the form of a 10-year q-forward contract with the Pall (UK) pension fund. 
 
5.4.9    The importance of q-forwards rests in the fact that they form basic building blocks from 
which other more complex, life-related derivatives can be constructed. When appropriately 
designed, a portfolio of q-forwards can be used to replicate and to hedge the longevity exposure 
of an annuity or a pension liability, or to hedge the mortality exposure of a life assurance book. 
We now provide an example. 
 
5.4.10   A series of q-forward contracts, with different ages and maturities, can be combined to 
hedge a longevity swap. Initially assume that there is a complete market in these contracts for 
all ages and maturities. Suppose the contract involves swapping at time t a fixed cashflow, 
?̃?𝑆(𝑡𝑡), for the realized survivor index, 𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥), where x is the age of the group being hedged at 
the inception of the swap. The fixed leg can be hedged using zero-coupon fixed-income bonds. 
The floating leg can be hedged approximately as follows. First, note that we can approximate 
the survivor index by expanding the cashflow in terms of the fixed legs of a set of q-forwards 
and their ultimate net payoffs (see Cairns et al., 2008): 
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where  and ( )0, ,Fq i x i+  = q-forward mortality rate (the 
fixed rate). Here, ( ),i x i∆ +  is the net payoff on the q-forward per unit at time 1i + . 
 
5.4.11   It follows that an approximate hedge (assuming interest rates are constant and equal to 
r per annum) for 𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥) can be achieved by holding: 
•  units of the 1-year q-forward; 
• ( ) ( )( )1( 2) 0, 11 1 0, ,
tt
Fj j
r q j x j−− −
= ≠
− + − +∏  units of the 2-year q-forward; 
• … 
• ( )( )10, 1 1 0, ,
t
Fj j t
q j x j−
= ≠ −
− − +∏  units of the t-year q-forward. 
5.4.12    In calculating these hedge quantities, we take account of the fact that, for example, the 
payoff at time 1 on the 1-year q-forward will be rolled up to time t at the risk-free rate of 
interest. Hence, the required payoff at time t needs to be multiplied by the discount factor (1 + 𝑟𝑟)−(𝑡𝑡−1). In a stochastic interest environment, a quanto derivative would be required. This 
is one that delivers a number of units, N, of a specified asset, where N is derived from a 
reference index that is different from the asset being delivered. In this context, N equals 
( ) ( )( )10,, 1 0, ,
t
Fj j i
i x i q j x j−
= ≠
−∆ + − +∏ , and we deliver, at time , N units of the fixed-
interest zero-coupon bond maturing at time t, with a price 𝑃𝑃(𝑖𝑖 + 1, 𝑡𝑡) at time 1i +  per unit. 
5.4.13 In the real world, a complete market in q-forward contracts does not exist and the 
hedge would have to be constructed from q-forward contracts with a more limited range of 
reference ages (e.g., 10-year age buckets) and maturities (e.g., out to 20 years at most). 
Nevertheless, the complete market hedge serves as a benchmark against which we can measure 
the effectiveness of hedges using a smaller number of q-forwards. 
5.4.14   A related contract is the ‘S-forward’ or ‘survivor’ forward contract, which is based on 
the survivor index, S(t,x), which itself is derived from the more fundamental mortality rates.  
An ‘S-forward’ is the basic building block of a longevity (survivor) swap first discussed in 
Dowd (2003). A longevity swap is composed of a stream of S-forwards with different maturity 
dates. It could be used, for example, for covering early cashflows, in conjunction with a q-
forward at time 10 to (partially) cover the later cashflows.40 
5.5   Tail-risk Protection (or Longevity Bull Call Spread) 
5.5.1   To date there have been at least five publicly announced deals involving tail risk 
protection. The first two involved Aegon: one in 2012 was executed by Deutsche Bank and 
another in 2013 by Société Générale.  The second two involved Delta Lloyd and Reinsurance 
Group of America (RGA Re) in 2014 and 2015, respectively. The most recent occurred in 
December 2017 between NN Life and Hannover Re and is similar to the Société Générale deal 
discussed below. 
5.5.2   Société Générale’s tail risk protection structure was described in Michaelson and 
Mulholland (2015).41 It is an index-based hedge using national population mortality data, but 
                                                 
40 See also: http://www.llma.org/files/documents/Technical_Note_S_Forward_Final.pdf; 
http://www.llma.org/files/documents/SampleTermSheet_-_S-Forward_Final.pdf; 
http://www.llma.org/files/documents/S-forward_Example_Sheet_Version_Update.xlsm 
41 See, also, Cairns and El Boukfaoui (2018) for a more detailed description. 
( ) ( ) ( ), , 0, ,Fi x i q i x i q i x i∆ + = + − +
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− + − +∏
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with minimal basis risk (see Section 6.3), and is designed around the following set of principles 
(p.30-31): 
In general, capital markets will be most effective in providing capital against the most 
remote pieces of longevity risk, called tail risk. This can be accomplished by creating ‘out-
of-the-money’ hedges against extreme longevity outcomes featuring option-like payouts 
that will occur if certain predefined thresholds are breached. These hedges would be 
capable of alleviating certain capital requirements to which the (re)insurers are subject, 
thereby enabling additional risk assumption. 
 
However, a well-constructed hedge programme must perform a delicate balancing act to 
be effective. On the one hand, it must provide an exposure that sufficiently mimics the 
performance of the underlying portfolio so as not to introduce unacceptable amounts of 
basis risk; while, on the other hand, it must simplify the modelling and underwriting 
process to a level that is manageable by a broad base of investors. Further, the hedge 
transaction must compress the 60+ year duration of the underlying retirement obligations 
to an investment horizon that is appealing to institutional investors. 
5.5.3   Basis risk42 will reduce hedge effectiveness and this will, in turn, reduce the allowable 
regulatory capital relief.43 However, basis risk with this product can be minimized if the hedger 
can customize three features of the hedge exposure: 
• The hedger is able to select the age and gender of the ‘cohorts’ (also known as model 
points) they want in the reference exposure. For example, the hedger selects an 
exposure totalling 70 cohorts – males and females aged 65–99 – to cover all the retired 
lives in the pension plan. 
• The hedger is able to choose the ‘exposure vector’, i.e., the ‘relative weighting’ of each 
cohort over time. This will equal the anticipated annuity payments for each cohort in 
each year of the risk period (see Table 4 for an example). 
• The hedger is able to select an ‘experience ratio matrix’, based on an experience study 
of its underlying book of business. For each cohort, in each year of the risk period, a 
fixed adjustment is applied to the national-population mortality rate to adjust for 
anticipated differences between the mortality profile of the hedger’s book of business 
and the corresponding reference population. So if the hedger’s underlying lives are 
healthier than the general population, they will assign experience ratios of less than 
100% to ‘scale down’ the mortality rate applied in the payout (see Table 5 for an 
example). 
 
                                                 
42 See Section 6.3. 
43 See Section 5.2. 
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Table 4: Exposure Vector: Relative Weighting of Cohorts Over Time 
 
Cohort Year 
1 
Year 
2 
Year 
3 
… Year 
15 
Year 
16 
Year 
17 
… Year 
54 
Year 
55 
Male 
65 
1000 995 985 … 590 565 535 … 65 55 
Male 
66 
980 975 960 … 505 485 450 … 45 40 
… … … … … … … … … … … 
Female 
99 
125 120 115 … 20 10 5 … 0 0 
 
Source: Michaelson and Mulholland (2015, Exhibit 1) 
 
Table 5: Experience Ratio Matrix  
 
Cohort Year 
1 
Year 
2 
Year 
3 
… Year 
15 
Year 
16 
Year 
17 
… Year 
54 
Year 
55 
Male 
65 
90% 89% 88% … 81% 80% 80% … 75% 75% 
Male 
66 
89% 88% 87% … 80% 79% 79% … 75% 75% 
… … … … … … … … … … … 
Female 
99 
77% 77% 76% … 75% 75% 75% … 75% 75% 
 
Source: Michaelson and Mulholland (2015, Exhibit 2) 
 
5.5.4   A risk exposure period of 55 years – as shown in Tables 4 and 5 – is unattractive to 
capital markets investors for a number of reasons. Liquidity in this market is still low and would 
be completely absent at these horizons. The maximum effective investment horizon is no more 
than 15 years. Just as important, the risks are too great. The likely advances in medical science 
suggests that the range of outcomes for longevity experience will be very wide for an 
investment horizon of more than half a century.  
 
5.5.5  To accommodate both an ‘exposure period’ of 55 years or more and a ‘risk period’ (or 
transaction length) of 15 years, the hedge programme uses a ‘commutation function’ to 
‘compress’ the risk period. As explained in Michaelson and Mulholland (2015, pp.32-33):  
This is accomplished by basing the final index calculations on the combination of two 
elements: (i) the actual mortality experience, as published by the national statistical 
reporting agency, applied to the exposure defined for the risk period; and (ii) the present 
value of the remaining exposure at the end of the risk period calculated using a ‘re-
parameterized’ longevity model that takes into account the realized mortality experience 
over the life of the transaction. This re-parameterization process involves: 
• Selecting an appropriate longevity risk model and establishing the initial 
parameterization of the model using publicly available historical mortality data 
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that exist as of the trade date. For a basic longevity model, the parameters that may 
be established, on a cohort-by-cohort basis, are (i) the current rate of mortality; 
(ii) the expected path of mortality improvement; and (iii) the variability in the 
expected path of mortality improvement. 
• ‘Freezing’ the longevity risk model, with regard to the related structure; but also 
defining, in advance, an objective process for updating the model’s parameters 
based on the additional mortality experience that will be reported over the risk 
period. A determination needs to be made as to which parameters are subject to 
updating, as well as the relative importance that will be placed on the historical 
data versus the data received during the risk period. 
• Re-parameterizing the longevity model by incorporating the additional mortality 
data reported over the life of the trade. This occurs at the end of the transaction 
risk period, once the mortality data for the final year in the risk period have been 
received. 
• Calculating the present value of the remaining exposure using the re-parameterized 
version of the initial longevity model. This is done by projecting future mortality 
rates, either stochastically or deterministically, and then discounting the cash flows 
using forward rates determined at the inception of the transaction. 
 
 
Figure 5: Mortality Rates Before, During and After the Risk Period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Projected mortality rates are calculated using experience data available at end of the risk 
period. Source: Michaelson and Mulholland (2015, Exhibit 3) 
 
 
5.5.6  The benefit of this approach to the hedger is that ‘roll risk’44 is reduced, since, by taking 
account of actual mortality rates over the risk period, there will be a much more reliable 
estimate at the end of the risk period of the expected net present value of the remaining 
                                                 
44 This is the risk that arises when a hedger is not able for some reason to put on a single 
hedge that covers the full term of its risk exposure and is forced to use a sequence of 
shorter term hedges which are rolled over when each hedge matures, with the risk that 
the next hedge in the sequence is set up on less favourable terms than the previous one. 
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exposure than if only historical mortality rates prior to the risk period were used.  The benefit 
to the investor is that the longevity model is known and not subject to change, so the only 
source of cash flow uncertainty in the hedge is the realization of national population mortality 
rates over the risk period – see Figure 5.  
 
5.5.7   The hedge itself is structured using a long out-of-the money call option bull spread on 
future mortality outcomes. The spread has two strike prices or, using insurance terminology, 
an attachment point and an exhaustion point.45 These strikes are defined relative to the 
distribution of ‘final index values’ calculated using the agreed longevity model.  The final index 
value will be a combination of: 
• The ‘actual’ mortality experience of the hedger throughout the risk period which is 
calculated by applying the reported national population mortality rates to the predefined 
‘exposure vector’ and ‘experience ratio matrix’ for each cohort in each year of the risk 
period, and accumulating with interest, using forward interest rates defined on the trade 
date. 
• The ‘commutation calculation’ which estimates the expected net present value of the 
remaining exposure at the end of the risk period, calculated using the re-parameterized 
version of the initial longevity model. 
 
5.5.8   Given the distribution of the final index, the attachment and exhaustion points are 
selected to maximize the hedger’s capital relief, taking into account the investors’ (i.e., risk 
takers’) wish to maximize the premium for the risk level assumed. Investors might also demand 
a ‘minimum premium’ to engage in the transaction. The intermediary – e.g., the investment 
bank – therefore needs to carefully work out the optimal amount of risk transfer, given both 
the hedger’s strategic objectives and investor preferences. 
 
5.5.9   The hedger then needs to calculate the level of capital required to cover possible 
longevity outcomes with a specified degree of confidence. For example, if the ‘best estimate’ 
of the longevity liability is $1bn, the (re)insurer may actually be required to issue $1.2bn, 
$200m of which is reserve capital to cover the potential increase in liability due to unanticipated 
longevity improvement with 99% confidence.  
 
5.5.10   The (re)insurer may then decide to implement a hedge transaction with a maximum 
payout of $100m. This transaction would begin making a payment to the hedger in the event 
the attachment point is breached, and then paying linearly up to $100m if the longevity outcome 
meets or exceeds the exhaustion point. This hedge provides a form of ‘contingent capital’ from 
investors (up to $100m of the $200m required), enabling the hedger to reduce the amount of 
regulatory capital it must issue – see Figure 6.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45 The spread is constructed using a long call at the lower strike price and a short call at 
the upper strike price. 
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Figure 6: Distribution of the Final Index Value and the Potential for Capital Reduction 
 
 
 
 
Source: Michaelson and Mulholland (2015, Exhibit 3) – not drawn to scale 
 
 
5.5.11  Tail risk protection was actually discussed in Living with Mortality in Section 6.4 
entitled ‘Geared Longevity Bonds and Longevity Spreads’, which we reproduce here. The 
geared longevity bond enables holders to increase hedging impact for any given capital outlay. 
 
5.5.12  One way to construct such a bond would be as follows. Looking ahead from time 0, the 
payment on each date t can in theory range from 0 to 1 (times the initial coupon). However, 
again looking ahead from time 0, we can also suppose that the payment at time t (the survivor 
index, 𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥); see paragraph 5.4.10 above) is likely to fall within a much narrower band, say 
𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥) ∈ [𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙(𝑡𝑡), 𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡)]. For example, if we are using a stochastic mortality model we could let 
𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙(𝑡𝑡) and 𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡) be the 2.5% and 97.5% percentiles of the simulated distribution of 𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥). 
These simulated confidence limits become part of the contract specification at time 0.  
 
5.5.13  We now set up a special purpose vehicle (SPV) at time 0 that holds 𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙(𝑡𝑡) units 
of the fixed interest zero-coupon bond that matures at time t for each 𝑡𝑡 = 1,⋯ ,𝑇𝑇 (or its 
equivalent using floating-rate debt and an interest-rate swap). Suppose the SPV is financed by 
two investors A and B. At time t, the SPV pays: (i) 𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥) − 𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙(𝑡𝑡) to A with a minimum of 0 
and a maximum of 𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙(𝑡𝑡); and (ii) 𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥) to B with a minimum of 0 and a 
maximum of 𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙(𝑡𝑡). 
 
5.5.14  The minimum and maximum payouts at each time to A and B ensure that the payments 
are always non-negative and can be financed entirely from the proceeds of the fixed-interest 
zero-coupon bond holdings of the SPV.  
 
5.5.15 The payoff at t to A can equivalently be written as  
 (𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥) − 𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙(𝑡𝑡)) +𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥{𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙(𝑡𝑡)− 𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥), 0}−𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥{𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥) − 𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡), 0} 
 
that is, a combination of a long forward contract, a long put option on 𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥) (or a ‘floorlet’, 
with a strike price that is lower than the at-the-money forward rate), and a short call on 𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥) 
(or a ‘caplet’ with a strike price that is higher than the at-the-money forward rate). The bond as 
a whole, therefore, is a combination of forwards, floorlets and caplets. Continuing with the 
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option terminology, we can also observe that the payoff to investor A is often referred to as a 
long ‘bull call spread’, and for this reason we refer to the payoff in the current context as a long 
‘longevity bull call spread’.  
 
5.5.16  Let us suppose that, for each t, 𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙(𝑡𝑡) and 𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡) have been chosen so that the value of 
the floorlet and the caplet are equal. In this case, the price payable at time 0 by investor A is 
equal to the sum of the prices of the T forward contracts paying 𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥) − 𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙(𝑡𝑡) at times 𝑡𝑡 =1,⋯ ,𝑇𝑇. This is equal to (i) the price for the longevity bond paying 𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥) at times 𝑡𝑡 = 1,⋯ ,𝑇𝑇, 
minus (ii) the price for the fixed-interest bond paying 𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙(𝑡𝑡) at times 𝑡𝑡 = 1,⋯ ,𝑇𝑇. This structure 
therefore gives investors a similar exposure to the risks in 𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥) for a lower initial price. For 
this reason, we describe the collection of longevity bull spreads as a geared longevity bond. 
 
5.5.17  As an alternative, 𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡) might be set to 1, meaning that the caplet has zero value (𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥) 
cannot be bigger than 1). With this structure, investor A has full protection against 
unanticipated improvements in longevity, but gives away any benefits from poorer longevity 
than anticipated. 
 
5.5.18  It is important to note in the above construction that there is a smooth progression in 
the division of the coupon payments between the counterparties over the range of 𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥). This 
is preferable to a contract that has a jump in the amount of the payment as 𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥) crosses some 
threshold: as often happens with such contracts as barrier options, arguments can often arise as 
to whether the particular threshold was crossed or not. Such difficulties are avoided with the 
smooth progression. 
 
5.5.19   The bond described here is a variation on the Société Générale structure where the 
payoff at T depends only on the single survivor index 𝑆𝑆(𝑇𝑇, 𝑥𝑥). In the more general case, the 
payoff depends on the values of 𝑆𝑆(1, 𝑥𝑥),… , 𝑆𝑆(𝑇𝑇, 𝑥𝑥), and the forecast values at T of 
𝑆𝑆(𝑇𝑇 + 1, 𝑥𝑥), 𝑆𝑆(𝑇𝑇 + 2, 𝑥𝑥),…. 
 
 
6. INDEX VERSUS CUSTOMIZED HEDGES, AND BASIS RISK  
 
6.1 Overview 
Lucida and Canada Life implemented two very different kinds of capital markets longevity 
hedges in 2008. Lucida executed a standardized hedge linked to a population mortality index, 
whereas Canada Life executed a customized hedge linked to the actual mortality experience of 
a population of annuitants. Aegon’s hedges with Deutsche Bank in 2012 and with Société 
Générale in 2013 were also index hedges, but they were designed to minimize the basis risk 
involved.46 It is important to understand the differences between index and customized hedges. 
                                                 
46 Aegon had a history of buying up smaller insurance companies all over Holland, so had 
a well-diversified mortality base that was similar to that of (and therefore highly correlated 
with) the national population, so the population basis risk in the hedge was minimal. 
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It is also important to understand, measure and manage the basis risk in index hedges. This, in 
turn, will have implications for regulatory capital relief. 
 
6.2 Index versus Customized Hedges 
6.2.1   Standardized index-based longevity hedges have some advantages over the customized 
hedges that are currently more familiar to pension funds and annuity providers. In particular, 
they have the advantages of simplicity, cost and greater potential for liquidity. But they also 
have obvious disadvantages, principally the fact that they are not perfect hedges and leave a 
residual basis risk (see Table 6) that requires the index hedge to be carefully calibrated.  
 
 
Table 6: Standardized Index Hedges vs. Customized Hedges 
 Advantages Disadvantages 
Standardized 
index  hedge 
• Cheaper than customized 
hedges  
• Lower set-up/operational 
costs 
• Shorter maturity, so lower 
counterparty credit exposure 
 
• Not a perfect hedge: 
o Basis risk 
o Roll risk 
o Base table estimation risk 
Customized 
hedge 
• Exact hedge, so no residual 
basis risk 
• Set-and-forget hedge, 
requires minimal monitoring 
• More expensive than 
standardized hedge 
• High set-up and operational 
costs 
• Poor liquidity 
• Credit risk: Longer maturity, 
so larger counterparty credit 
exposure 
• Less attractive to investors 
 
Source: Coughlan (2007a) 
 
 
6.2.2   Coughlan et al. (2007b) show that a liquid, hedge-effective market could be built around 
just eight standardized q-forward contracts with: 
• a specific maturity (e.g., 10 years); 
• two genders (male, female); 
• four age buckets (50-59, 60-69, 70-79, 80-89). 
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6.2.3   Figure 7 presents the mortality improvement correlations within the male 70-79 age 
bucket which is centred on age 75 (Coughlan et al., 2007c). These figures show that the 
correlations (based on graduated mortality rates) are very high. Consequently, a tailored hedge 
using, say, 10 q-forwards on ages 70 to 79 will be only marginally more effective than a single 
q-forward using a standard 70-79 age bucket. Coughlan (2007a) estimates that the hedge 
effectiveness (of a value hedge) is around 86% (i.e., the standard deviation of the liabilities is 
reduced by 86%, leaving a residual risk of 14%) for a large and well diversified pension plan 
or annuity portfolio: see Figure 8.47  
 
6.2.4   In order to keep the number of contracts to a manageable level, individual contracts use 
the average (or ‘bucketed’) mortality across 10 ages rather than single ages. This averaging has 
positive and negative effects. On the one hand, the averaging reduces the basis risk that arises 
from the non-systematic mortality risk that is present in crude mortality rates, even at the 
population level.48 On the other hand, it introduces some basis risk depending on the specific 
age-structure of the population being hedged. This we now discuss in more detail. 
 
 
Figure 7: 5-Year Mortality Improvement Correlations 
with England & Wales Males Aged 75 
 
 
                                                 
47 A subsequent study by Coughlan et al. (2011) reconfirmed the high degree of 
effectiveness available with longevity hedges based on national population indices for large 
pension plans. This study considered a pension fund with a membership whose mortality 
experience was the same as the UK CMI (Continuous Mortality Investigation) assured lives 
population; with a hedge based on the England & Wales LifeMetrics Index, hedge 
effectiveness of 82.4% could be achieved. The same study also considered a pension fund 
with a membership whose mortality experience was the same at the population of 
California. With a hedge based on the US LifeMetrics Index, hedge effectiveness of 86.5% 
could be achieved.  
48 For example, for England & Wales males, variation in the bucketed q-forward payoff 
that is solely due to non-systematic mortality risk (i.e., sampling variation in the death 
counts) will have a standard deviation of around 0.3% of the value of the q-forward fixed 
leg. Relative to the uncertainty in the true mortality rate underpinning the q-forward payoff 
with a 10-year horizon, this sampling variation is negligible. 
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Figure 8: The Hedge Effectiveness of q-Forwards 
 
6.3 Basis Risk 
6.3.1   Basis risk is the residual risk associated with imperfect hedging where the movements 
in the underlying exposure are not perfectly correlated with movements in the hedging 
instrument. Basis risk and its quantification has recently attracted the attention of both 
academics and practitioners (e.g., Li and Hardy, 2011, Cairns et al., 2013, Longevity Basis 
Risk Working Group, 2014, Villegas et al., 2017, Li et al., 2017, and Cairns and El Boukfaoui, 
2018).   
 
6.3.2   Within the context of longevity risk hedging, a number of sources of basis risk arise: 
population basis risk; base-table risk; structural risk; restatement risk; and idiosyncratic risk.  
 
6.3.3   Population basis risk is, perhaps, the form of basis risk that most readily comes to mind 
when considering an index based longevity hedge. Specifically, a hedger might choose to use 
a hedging instrument that is linked to a different population from its own population that it 
wishes to hedge. This is most common where the hedging instrument is linked to an index 
based on national mortality rates, while the hedger’s own population is a distinctive sub-
population with different characteristics from the national average. As a consequence, 
underlying mortality rates might not just be at a different level from that of the national 
population, but rates of improvement in both the short and long term might not be perfectly 
correlated. Modelling and understanding the differences between two populations is an active 
and rapidly developing subject of research.49 
 
6.3.4   Base-table risk concerns how accurately hedgers and also receivers of longevity risk are 
able to assess the mortality base table for both the hedger’s own population and the national 
                                                 
49 Modelling population basis risk is also a key ongoing element of the Institute and Faculty 
of Actuaries’ ARC research programme on ‘Modelling Measurement and Management of 
Longevity and Morbidity Risk’ (www.actuaries.org.uk/arc). 
Source: Coughlan (2007a) 
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population. Whether or not base-table risk contributes to residual risk for the hedger then 
depends on the nature of the longevity hedge. At one end of the spectrum, from the perspective 
of the hedger, a customized longevity swap leaves the hedger with no base-table risk, while the 
receiver is exposed and should charge a higher price to reflect this extra risk. In contrast, for 
an index-based hedge, base-table risk will be relevant. Base-table risk will then make a more 
significant contribution to total basis risk if the hedger’s own population is small or the time 
horizon of the hedge is short. 
 
6.3.5   Structural risk relates to the design of the hedging instrument, and it can arise even if 
there is no population basis risk, or base-table risk: 
• The hedging instrument might have a non-linear payoff as a function of the underlying 
risk. This includes contracts with an option-type payoff structure such as the bull call 
spread in Michaelson and Mulholland (2015) and Cairns and El Boukfaoui (2018), 
leaving residual risk both below and above the attachment and exhaustion points. It also 
includes q-forwards: these do not include any optionality, but liability cashflows are 
typically non-linear combinations of the underlying mortality rates. 
• The hedging instrument might have a finite maturity, meaning that the longevity risk 
that emerges after the maturity date is a residual risk that cannot be hedged.  
• The reference ages embedded in the hedging instruments might not allow exact 
matching of the ages in the hedger’s population.  
• The number of units of the hedging instrument (i.e., the hedge ratio) might not be 
optimal (i.e., might not minimize residual risk). This might be either unavoidable or 
unintentional (e.g., through the use of a poorly calibrated model).  
• Hedging instruments may not incorporate an inflation linkage and so may not match 
well with realized pension plan or annuity benefit increases. 
In general, structural risk can be adjusted, for example, through the choice of: attachment and 
exhaustion points; the maturity date; the reference ages; the number of q- or S-forwards; and 
careful calibration and optimisation using the chosen stochastic mortality model.  
 
6.3.6   Restatement risk concerns the possibility that official estimates of the national 
population or death counts might be revised up or down, with potential impacts on index-based 
hedge payoffs (Cairns et al., 2016). Restatements will often impact on previously stated 
mortality rates (especially following a decennial census). Index-based longevity hedges will 
probably link contractually to the first announcement of a mortality rate, meaning that the 
restatement of past mortality rates will not alter past payments and hence introduce an 
additional risk. However, restatements will also have an impact on future estimated population 
numbers and consequent mortality rates. The future risks and impacts of such restatements can 
be assessed through use of the same methodology for identifying phantoms proposed in Cairns 
et al. (2016).  
 
6.3.7   Idiosyncratic risk50 is primarily linked to sampling variation and its financial impact 
within the hedger’s population. As with some other examples of basis risk, the impact of 
idiosyncratic risk will depend on the nature of the hedge (indemnity versus other forms). Given 
the evolution of the systematic risk in the underlying mortality rates, individuals will either die 
or survive independently of each other. Proportionately, this risk is larger for smaller pension 
funds. The level of idiosyncratic risk is also dependent on the heterogeneity in pension amounts 
(leading to concentration risk): for example, a 1000-member pension plan in which 10% of the 
                                                 
50 That is, randomness in individual lifetimes and financial concentrations associated with 
a small group of individuals.  
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members are directors (or ‘big cheeses’) who generate 90% of the liabilities will be more risky 
than a 1000-member plan with equal pensions. 
 
6.3.8   Finally, as remarked in Cairns (2014), accurate assessment of basis risk is one part of 
the process of choosing the best hedge. First, one needs to identify the different options for 
hedging.51 Second, the risk appetite of the hedger needs to be properly assessed. Third, there 
needs to be an accurate assessment of the basis risk under each hedge. Fourth, prices need to 
be established for each hedge. Fifth, the combination of price, basis risk and risk appetite then 
point to a best choice out of all of the options available to the hedger.52 Cairns (2014) also 
highlights that no single hedging option is best for all pension plans. Everything else being 
equal, customized hedges are more likely to be preferred to index hedges by: smaller pension 
plans rather than larger (due to the greater idiosyncratic risk); and pension plan sponsors that 
are more risk averse. Also, certain hedging options (e.g., longevity swaps) are currently only 
available to pension plans with sufficiently large liabilities. 
 
6.4 Other Types of Basis Risk 
Other forms of basis risk might arise if a pension plan seeks to hedge the longevity risk 
associated with a group of active or deferred members, rather than retired members. These 
groups bring additional risks, including member options (such as lump sum commutation, 
trivial commutation, early/late retirement, increasing a partner’s benefits at the expense of the 
member’s benefits, and pension increase exchanges), partner status at retirement or member 
death, and salary risk. The plan’s quantum of exposure to longevity risk depends on how these 
risks turn out, a risk that itself is not hedgeable. 
 
 
7.  CREDIT RISK, REGULATORY CAPITAL, AND COLLATERAL 
7.1 Overview 
Another risk in Table 6 is counterparty credit risk. This is the risk that one of the counterparties 
to, say, a longevity swap contract defaults owing money to the other counterparty. When a 
swap is first initiated, both counterparties might expect a zero excess profit or loss.53 But over 
time, as a result of realized mortality rates deviating from the rates that were forecast at the 
time the swap started, one counterparty’s position will be showing a profit and the other will 
be showing an equivalent loss.  The insurance industry addresses this issue via regulatory 
capital and the capital markets deal with it via collateral. 
                                                 
51 Good enterprise risk management means consideration of all of the available options. 
Although challenging, the administrative costs of carrying out such an exercise is small 
compared to the potential economic impact of making the right or wrong choice. 
52 Conversely, a hedger’s advisers should not let concerns about their own reputational 
risk influence recommendations: arguably, reputational risk is smaller for indemnity based 
hedges, and larger for index-based hedges which require higher levels of skill in modelling 
mortality. 
53 This is the case for a transaction involving a pension plan and an insurer, where 
allowance is made for the insurer’s cost of capital and normal profit etc. In a transaction 
involving an insurer and a reinsurer, it is typical for fees to be added to the ‘fixed leg’, so 
commercially there will be a loss to the cedant on day 1. 
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7.2  Regulatory Capital 
7.2.1   The regulatory regime covering insurance companies domiciled in the UK is governed 
by the Solvency II Directive which came into effect in January 2016 and is used to set 
regulatory capital requirements. 
 
7.2.2   Regulatory capital is the level of capital or Own Funds required by an insurer’s 
regulatory authority, the PRA in the UK. Solvency II begins with a calculation of the insurer’s 
liabilities, known as technical provisions, which comprises a 'best estimate' of the liabilities 
plus a risk margin – in the case where the liability cannot be reliably measured and/or suitably 
hedged. The sum of the best estimate and risk margin can be thought of as the market consistent 
value or fair value. On top of this, insurers must issue additional risk-based capital to meet first 
the Minimum Capital Requirement (MCR) and then the Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR).  
 
7.2.3   A major objective of Solvency II is to value all assets and liabilities on a market-
consistent basis and to ensure that the regulatory capital that insurance companies issue reflects 
all the unhedged risks on their balance sheets. The capital should be sufficient to ensure that an 
insurance company can either (i) survive the next 12 months with a 99.5% probability or (ii) 
survive a set of prescribed stress tests. The amount required can be determined using either a 
stochastic internal model or through the use of the standard stress test, which in the case of 
longevity risk is a sudden 20% reduction in mortality rates across all ages. For a 65-year old 
UK male, this corresponds approximately to a 1.5 year increase in life expectancy or a 7% 
increase in pension liabilities.  
 
7.2.4   A consequence of any market-consistent approach is that both assets and liabilities are 
prone to market volatility. Insurance companies invest in long-term illiquid assets, like 
infrastructure, real estate and equity release mortgages, to reduce asset price volatility, and in 
corporate bonds to benefit from the credit and illiquidity premia embodied in their higher 
returns compared with government bonds.  
 
7.2.5   In the case of long-term liabilities, such as annuities and buy-outs, short-term asset price 
volatility can be partially offset by ‘matching adjustments’ (MAs). MAs are part of Solvency 
II regulations that depart from a market-consistent approach, by allowing insurers54 to estimate 
the illiquidity premium – inherent in the asset portfolio if it contains such illiquid assets – to be 
added to the risk-free rate for the purposes of discounting liabilities. To do this, the insurer 
needs to allocate a specific pool of assets to the liability, where the assets are selected to match 
the cash-flow characteristics of the liability. The assets need to be matched for the entire term 
of the liability, in which case the liability can be valued using the higher but less volatile MA-
adjusted discount rate. Because both the level and volatility of the liability calculated using this 
approach are now lower, lower levels of Own Funds and hence SCR are needed. However, 
because of longevity risk and the dearth of long-maturity longevity-linked assets available to 
hold in the portfolio, the asset match can never be perfect. The higher MA-adjusted discount 
rate is reduced somewhat to allow for this and the level of Own Funds correspondingly raised. 
A particular example is non-pensioner members of pension plans who have both greater 
longevity risk and more optionality than pensioner members. Both these factors lower the MA-
adjusted discount rate and, by raising the level of Own Funds, increase the cost of providing 
deferred annuities to the pension plan or buying out this segment of the pension plan. Insurers 
also make use of reinsurance to reduce the volatility of liabilities and this will again have an 
effect on Own Funds. 
                                                 
54 And reinsurers. 
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7.2.6   One possible implication of Solvency II is that insurers might migrate away from the 
current cash-flow hedging paradigm towards the value-hedging paradigm. Specifically, 
insurers might aim to hedge their liability in one year’s time as a way to reduce their SCR under 
Solvency II. This requires comparison of liability and hedge instrument values one year ahead.  
 
7.2.7    Despite Solvency II, some pension plans considering de-risking remain concerned about 
the financial strength of some insurers, which is why consultants, such as Barnett Waddingham, 
have launched an insurer financial strength review service, providing information on an 
insurer’s structure, solvency position, credit rating, and key risks in their business model.  
 
7.2.8   Regulatory capital deals principally with the credit risk of the insurer.55 Conversely, the 
insurer faces credit risk from the pension plan in the case of, say, a longevity swap, and 
collateral would need to be posted to deal with this. 
 
7.3 Collateral 
7.3.1   The role of collateral is to reduce if not entirely eliminate counterparty credit risk in 
both capital market transactions and insurance contracts. 
 
7.3.2   Collateral in the form of high quality securities needs to be posted by the loss-making 
counterparty to cover such losses. However, the collateral needs to be funded and the funding 
costs will depend on the level of interest rates. Further, the quality of the collateral and the 
conditions under which a counterparty can substitute one form of collateral for another need to 
be agreed. This is done in the credit support annex (CSA) to the ISDA56 Master Agreement 
that establishes the swap. The CSA also specifies how different types of collateral will be 
priced.  
 
7.3.3   All these factors are important for determining the value of the swap at different stages 
in its life. Biffis et al. (2016) use a theoretical model to show that the overall cost of 
collateralization in mortality or longevity swaps is similar to or lower than those found in the 
interest-rate swaps market on account of the diversifying effects of interest rate and longevity 
risks –  which are to a first order uncorrelated risks. In practice, agreeing the value of the 
collateral involves an iterative process.  Valuing the fixed leg is generally straightforward, but 
there can be differences of opinion in valuing the floating leg. It is typical in reinsurance 
contract negotiations for both sides to recommend a basis. If the difference is too far apart, both 
sides agree to bring in either one or two external experts. If only one is used, both sides are 
bound by their assessment. If two are used and they are close, both sides agree to split the 
difference: if they are still too far apart, both sides will allow the experts to appoint an agreed 
third expert. 
 
8.   LIQUIDITY 
 
8.1    Liquidity is another important issue raised in Table 6. The key problem with customized 
solutions for some participants57 is that they are not liquid and cannot easily be reversed. By 
contrast, liquidity is a key advantage of deep and well-developed capital market solutions. 
                                                 
55 It also covers the insurer’s underwriting, market and operational risks. 
56 International Swaps and Derivatives Association. 
57 It is not an issue for a pension plan if it is doing a longevity swap as a step to buy-out. 
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8.2   To ensure long-term viability, it is critical that a traded capital market instrument meets 
the needs of both hedgers and speculators (or traders). The former require hedge effectiveness, 
while the latter supply liquidity. However, liquidity requires standardized contracts. The fewer 
the number of standardized contracts traded, the greater the potential liquidity in each contract, 
but the lower the potential hedge effectiveness. There is therefore an important tradeoff to be 
made, such that the number of standardized contracts traded provides both adequate hedge 
effectiveness and adequate liquidity.  
 
8.3   If they are ever to achieve adequate liquidity, it is likely that capital-markets-based 
solutions will have to adopt mortality indices based on the national population as the primary 
means of transferring longevity risk or sub-population indices that are transparent, trustworthy, 
reliable and durable. However, potential hedgers, such as life assurers and pension funds, face 
a longevity risk exposure that is specific to their own policyholders and plan members: for 
example, it might be concentrated in specific socio-economic groups or in specific individuals 
such as the sponsoring company’s directors. Hedging using population mortality indices means 
that life assurers and pension funds will face basis risk if their longevity exposure differs from 
that of the national population. Herein lies the tension between index-based hedges and 
customized hedges of longevity risk, and, in turn, the unavoidable trade-off between basis risk 
and liquidity. 
 
8.4   The involvement of the capital markets would help to reduce the cost of managing 
longevity risk. This is because it should lead to an increase in capacity, together with greater 
pricing transparency (as a result of the activities of arbitrageurs58) and greater liquidity (as a 
result of the activities of speculators). These conditions should attract the interest of ILS 
investors, hedge funds, private equity investors, sovereign wealth funds, endowments, family 
offices and other investors seeking asset classes that have low correlation with existing 
financial assets. Longevity-linked assets naturally fit this bill.  
 
8.5   Currently, there is still insufficient interest from these classes of investor. However, Figure 
1 shows how the market might eventually come into balance, with increasing numbers of 
potential sellers of longevity risk protection attracted by a suitable risk premium to enter the 
market to meet the huge demands of potential buyers.  
 
9.  MORTALITY MODELS 
9.1 Overview 
It is clear from the solutions we have described above that mortality models play a critical role 
in their design and pricing (see, e.g., Figures 3 and 6). There are three classes of stochastic 
mortality model in use (with some models straddling more than one class): 
 
• extrapolative or time series models; 
• process-based models – which examine the biomedical processes that lead to death; 
• explanatory or causal models – which use information on factors which are believed to 
influence mortality rates such as cohort (i.e., year of birth), socio-economic status, 
lifestyle, geographical location, housing, education, medical advances and infectious 
diseases. 
                                                 
58 However, to be effective, arbitrageurs need well-defined pricing relationships between 
related securities and we are still at the very early days in the development of this market. 
 33 
Most of the models currently in use are in the first of these classes and we will concentrate on 
these in this section.  
9.2 Extrapolative or Time Series Models – Single Population Variants 
9.2.1   There are four classes of time-series-based mortality model in use. First is the Lee-Carter 
class of models (Lee and Carter, 1992) which makes no assumption about the degree of 
smoothness in mortality rates across adjacent ages or years. Second is the Cairns-Blake-Dowd 
(CBD) class of models (Cairns, Blake and Dowd, 2006) which builds in an assumption of 
smoothness in mortality rates across adjacent ages in the same year (but not between years).59 
Third is the P-splines model (Currie et al., 2004) which assumes smoothness across both years 
and ages.60 Finally, there is the Age-Period-Cohort (APC) model which has its origins in 
medical statistics (Osmond, 1985; Jacobsen et al., 2002), and was first introduced in an 
actuarial context by Renshaw and Haberman (2006). Other features have also jumped from one 
class to another with the resulting genealogy mapped out in Figure 9. The first two classes of 
models have also been extended to allow for a cohort effect.61  All these models were subjected 
to a rigorous analysis in Cairns et al. (2009 and 2011a) and Dowd et al. (2010b and 2010c). 
The models were assessed for their goodness of fit to historical data and for both their ex-ante 
and ex-post forecasting properties.  
 
9.2.2   Cairns et al. (2009) used a set of quantitative and qualitative criteria to assess each 
model’s ability to explain historical patterns of mortality: quality of fit, as measured by the 
Bayes Information Criterion (BIC); ease of implementation; parsimony; transparency; 
incorporation of cohort effects; ability to produce a non-trivial correlation structure between 
ages; and robustness of parameter estimates relative to the period of data employed. The study 
concluded that a version of the CBD model allowing for a cohort effect was found to have the 
most robust and stable parameter estimates over time using mortality data from both England 
& Wales and the US. This model (usually referred to as ‘M7’) is now the keystone of one of 
the two approaches recommended by the Life and Longevity Markets Association (LLMA)62 
(Longevity Basis Risk Working Group, 2014, Villegas et al., 2017, and Li et al., 2017). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
59 The CBD model was specifically designed for modelling higher age (55+) mortality rates. 
It has recently been generalized to account for the different structure of mortality rates at 
lower ages by, e.g., Plat (2009) and Hunt and Blake (2014). 
60 Other academic studies of mortality models include Hobcraft et al. (1982), Booth et al. 
(2002a,b), Brouhns et al. (2002a,b, 2005), Renshaw and Haberman (2003a,b, 2006, 
2008), Biffis (2005), Czado et al. (2005), Delwarde et al. (2007), Koissi et al. (2006), 
Pedroza (2006), Bauer et al. (2008, 2010), Gourieroux and Monfort (2008), Hari et al. 
(2008), Kuang et al. (2008), Haberman and Renshaw (2009, 2011, 2012, 2013), 
Hatzopoulos and Haberman (2009, 2011), Li et al. (2009, 2015a), Wang and Preston 
(2009), Biffis et al. (2010), Debonneuil (2010), Lin and Tzeng (2010), Murphy (2010), 
Yang et al. (2010), Coelho and Nunes (2011), D’Amato et al. (2011, 2012a,b), Gaille and 
Sherris (2011), Li and Chan (2011), Milidonis et al. (2011), Russo et al. (2011), Russolillo 
et al. (2011), Sweeting (2011), Wang et al. (2011), Alai and Sherris (2014b), Aleksic and 
Börger (2012), Hainaut (2012), Hyndman et al. (2013), Mitchell et al. (2013), Nielsen and 
Nielsen (2014), Mayhew and Smith (2014), Danesi at al. (2015), O’Hare and Li (2015), 
Berkum et al. (2016), Currie (2016), and Richards et al. (2017). 
61 See, e.g., Cairns et al. (2009). 
62 www.llma.org 
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Figure 9: A Genealogy of Stochastic Mortality Models 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Cairns (2014) 
 
9.2.3   Cairns et al. (2011a) focused on the qualitative forecasting properties of the models63 
by evaluating the ex-ante plausibility of their probability density forecasts in terms of the 
following qualitative criteria: biological reasonableness;64 the plausibility of predicted levels 
of uncertainty in forecasts at different ages; and the robustness of the forecasts relative to the 
sample period used to fit the models. The study found that while a good fit to historical data, 
as measured by the BIC, is a promising starting point, it does not guarantee sensible forecasts. 
For example, one version of the CBD model allowing for a cohort effect produced such 
implausible forecasts of US male mortality rates that it could be dismissed as a suitable 
forecasting model. This study also found that the Lee-Carter model produced forecasts at 
higher ages that were ‘too precise’, in the sense of having too little uncertainty relative to 
historical volatility. The problems with these particular models were not evident from simply 
estimating their parameters: they only became apparent when the models were used for 
forecasting. The other models (including the APC model) performed well, producing robust 
and biologically plausible forecasts.  
9.2.4   It is also important to examine the ex post forecasting performance of the models. This 
involves conducting both backtesting and goodness-of-fit and analyses. Dowd et al. (2010b), 
undertook the first of these analyses. Backtesting is based on the idea that forecast distributions 
should be compared against subsequently realized mortality outcomes and if the realized 
outcomes are compatible with their forecasted distributions, then this would suggest that the 
models that generated them are good ones, and vice versa. The study examined four different 
                                                 
63 The P-splines model was excluded from the analysis because of its inability to produce 
fully stochastic projections of future mortality rates. 
64 A method of reasoning used to establish a causal association (or relationship) between 
two factors that is consistent with existing medical knowledge. 
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classes of backtest: those based on the convergence of forecasts through time towards the 
mortality rate(s) in a given year; those based on the accuracy of forecasts over multiple 
horizons; those based on the accuracy of forecasts over rolling fixed-length horizons; and those 
based on formal hypothesis tests that involve comparisons of realized outcomes against 
forecasts of the relevant densities over specified horizons. The study found that the Lee-Carter 
model, the APC model and the CBD model (both with and without a cohort effect) performed 
well most of the time and there was relatively little to choose between them. However, another 
version of the Lee-Carter model allowing for a cohort effect repeatedly showed evidence of 
instability.65   
9.2.5    Dowd et al. (2010c) set out a framework for evaluating the goodness of fit of stochastic 
mortality models and applied it to the same models considered by Dowd et al. (2010b). The 
methodology used exploited the structure of each model to obtain various residual series that 
are predicted to be independently and identically distributed (iid) standard normal under the 
null hypothesis of model adequacy. Goodness of fit can then be assessed using conventional 
tests of the predictions of iid standard normality. For the data set considered (English & Welsh 
male mortality data over ages 64-89 and years 1961-2007), there are some notable differences 
amongst the various models, but none of the models performed well in all tests and no model 
clearly dominates the others. In particular, all the models failed to capture long-term changes 
in the trend in mortality rates. Further development work on these models is therefore needed. 
It might be the case that there is no single best model and that some models work well in some 
countries, while others work well in other countries.  
 
9.2.6   The CBD model appears to work well in England & Wales for higher ages, and Figures 
10 – 12 present three applications of the model using ONS data for England & Wales.  
 
9.2.7   The first (Figure 10) is a longevity fan chart (Dowd et al, 2010a) which shows the 
increasing funnel of uncertainty concerning future life expectancies out to 2052 of 65-year-old 
males from England & Wales.66 By 2047, life expectancy from age 65 is centred around 23 
years, shown by the dark central band: an increase of 4 years on the expectation for the year 
2017. The different bands within the fan correspond to 5% bands of probability with the lower 
and upper boundaries at the 5% and 95% quantiles. Adding these together, the whole fan chart 
shows the 90% confidence interval for the forecast range of outcomes. We can be 90% 
confident that by 2047, the life expectancy of a 65-year-old English & Welsh male will lie 
between 21.3 and 24.3. This represents a huge range of uncertainty. Since every additional year 
of life expectancy at age 65 adds around 4 to 5%67 to the present value of pension liabilities, 
the cost of providing pensions in 2060 could be 7 to 8% higher than the best estimate for 2047 
made in 2017. 
 
9.2.8   The second is a survivor fan chart (Blake et al., 2008) which shows the 90% confidence 
interval for the survival rates of English & Welsh males who reached 65 at the end of 2016. 
Figure 11 shows that there is relatively little survivorship risk before age 75: a fairly reliable 
estimate is that 20% of this group will have died by age 75.68 The uncertainty increases rapidly 
                                                 
65 See Renshaw and Haberman (2006). This was later explained in terms of a missing 
identification condition in the model (Hunt and Villegas, 2015). 
66 Note projections run from 2017 based on a variant of the CBD model estimated using 
data for ages 50-89 and years 1977-2016. 
67 See paragraph 2.2. 
68 This is one of the reasons why the EIB/BNP Paribas bond discussed in paragraph 1.1.1 
was considered expensive: the first 10 years of cash flows are, in present value terms, the 
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after 75 and reaches a maximum just after age 90, when anywhere between 27 and 38% of the 
original cohort will still be alive. We then have the long ‘tail’ where the remainder of this 
cohort dies out some time between 2042 and 2062. 
 
 
Figure 10: Longevity Fan Chart for 65-year-old English & Welsh Males 
 
Source: Own calculations 
 
 
Figure 11: Cohort Survivor Fan Chart for 65-year-old English & Welsh Males
 
Source: Own calculations 
 
 
 
                                                 
most costly cash flows of a bond, and, in the case of the EIB bond, incorporate a longevity 
hedge that is not really needed. 
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9.2.9   The third is a mortality fan chart which shows the 90% confidence interval for 65-year 
old English & Welsh males who reached 65 at the end of 2016. Figure 12 shows that there is 
an increasingly low probability of surviving year to year at very high ages, even with predicted 
mortality improvements. 
 
 
Figure 12: Cohort Mortality Fan Chart for 65-year-old English & Welsh Males 
 
Source: Own calculations 
 
 
9.2.10   By building off a good mortality forecasting model estimated using data from an 
objective, transparent and relevant set of mortality indices, fan charts provide a very useful tool 
for both quantifying and visually understanding longevity, survivor and mortality risks. 
Table 7: UK Life Expectancy at Age 65 
Version of the CMI Model Male Female 
CMI_2013 22.8 years 25.1 years 
CMI_2014 22.8 years 24.9 years 
CMI_2015 22.5 years 24.6 years 
CMI_2016 22.2 years 24.1 years 
Source: Continuous Mortality Investigation 
 
9.2.11  One key problem that extrapolative models have is their difficulty in differentiating 
between a genuine change in the trend of mortality rates and a temporary blip in mortality rates 
until some time after the change has occurred. In 2016, the UK Office for National Statistics 
reported that longevity improvements rates at very high ages have slowed down since 2011; 
but it is not yet clear whether this is a genuine change in the long-term trend, a short-term 
austerity-driven adjustment, or just the result of a purely random deviation from the previous 
trend.69 Nevertheless, it prompted a debate in the UK in 2016 about the reliability of life 
expectancy projections. Mortality improvements in UK males averaged 0.6% p.a. over the 
                                                 
69 Anthony Hilton (2016) Life line, Pensions World, May.  See also 
www.bbc.com/news/health-4060825 
65 70 75 80 85
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
Cohort Age, x
C
oh
or
t M
or
ta
lit
y 
R
at
e,
 q
(t,
x+
t-1
)
 38 
preceding four years, compared with 3.2% p.a. in the decade before and 1.5-2% between 1995 
and 2000.70 In response to a possible trend change, the UK Continuous Mortality Investigation 
(CMI) has lowered its estimate of both male and female life expectancy at age 65 in each of 
the last four years, as Table 7 shows.  
 
9.2.12   In October 2016, Tim Gordon, head of longevity at Aon Hewitt, said: ‘This is the most 
extreme reversal in mortality improvement trends seen in the past 40 years. What was initially 
assumed by many actuaries to be a blip is increasingly looking more like an earlier-than-
expected fall-off in mortality improvements. The industry is currently trying to digest all the 
implications of this emerging information and – inevitably – it is taking time to feed through 
into insurance and reinsurance pricing’. Others say that this could just be ‘noise’. Matt 
Wilmington, director of pension risk transfer at L&G, points out that: ‘Two years doesn’t make 
a trend – it’s very volatile from year to year. If we had another five years where we saw far 
fewer deaths than expected, then we might start to see fairly significant changes, but where we 
are now, there’s not enough to persuade us – or many of the pension plans we work with – that 
there’s a vast reversal in trend in terms of life expectancy just yet’. Despite this, Aon Hewitt 
said that there was sufficient dislocation in the pricing of longevity swaps that pension plans 
should consider delaying transactions until the market corrects. By the middle of 2017, Aon 
Hewitt reported that the longevity market was back in sync.71 However, Tim Gordon also 
warned against attempts to time the market: ‘Timing the longevity market in the same way you 
would time an equity market is extremely difficult, and plans could be in danger of missing 
opportunities now if they did that’. The difference in mortality improvement rates before and 
after 2011 is equivalent to a difference in liabilities of 1% or four months of pension payments 
for every retiree: UK pension liabilities would be £25bn lower if the future mortality 
improvement rate were 1% rather than 3%.72   
 
9.2.13   Consultant Barnett Waddingham has put forward the suggestion that higher health and 
social care spending between 2000 and 2010 (which grew at an average annual real rate of 4%) 
may have caused a blip in longevity estimates by accelerating improvements. Since 2009, 
health spending has grown at just 1% per annum in real terms, social care spending has fallen 
in real terms, and there have been lower mortality improvements – although this correlation 
does not imply causation.73 
9.3 Extrapolative or Time Series Models – Multi-Population Variants 
9.3.1   There are a number of reasons why it might be appropriate or desirable to model two or 
more populations simultaneously. First, a pension plan might often be relatively small in 
relation to the national population; it might have a relatively short run of data (e.g., relatively 
limited coverage of ages, or only a few calendar years of observations) or simply have a lot of 
sampling variation. In contrast, many national populations have a much longer run of data. By 
                                                 
70 Own calculations: ages 60-89 covering the periods 2001-2011 (3.2% p.a. 
improvements) and 2011-2015 (0.6%). Females 2.6% falling to 0.2%. 
71 All quotes taken from Jenna Gadhavi (2017) Does the bell toll for longevity swaps?, 
Engaged Investor, 13 January; http://aon.mediaroom.com/news-releases?item=137499; 
and http://aon.mediaroom.com/news-releases?item=137590 
72 Professional Pensions, 26 January 2017. 
73 Professional Pensions, 29 March 2017. According to the Institute for Fiscal Studies: ‘But 
looking at all Department of Health spending rather than the NHS only, after adjusting for 
the ageing of the population, per-capita real spending will be lower in 2019–20 than in 
2009–10. An additional £1.3 billion of Department of Health spending would be required 
in 2019–20 just to maintain 2009–10 levels’ (Luchinskaya et al., 2017). 
 39 
modelling the two populations in tandem and exploiting the correlations between the two, it 
might be possible to achieve better quality forecasts for the pension plan. Second, the use of 
multiple population mortality models enables more accurate modelling of the relationships 
between two or more groups that are directly of interest (e.g., males and females; assured lives 
and annuitants in a life insurer’s book of business; life insurance portfolios in different 
countries etc.). This will lead to better consistency in forecasts as well as, for example, an 
assessment of the diversification benefits of having less-than-perfectly correlated groups of 
lives. Third, multi-population modelling is essential for any institution seeking to hedge its 
exposure to longevity risk using index-based hedging instruments: the model is required to 
assess the level of basis risk in the transaction. 
 
9.3.2   The development of multi-population mortality models has lagged single population 
modelling quite considerably partly due to a lack of good quality sub-population datasets (the 
CMI assured lives dataset being a notable exception). The Human Mortality Database (HMD) 
has data for many countries and offers a useful starting point, but sub-population data present 
particular challenges that are often not present in international data (e.g., shorter runs of data, 
smaller population sizes etc.). In the demography literature, Li and Lee (2005) laid out some 
key foundations: in particular, the principle of coherence. The ratio of mortality rates in two 
populations can and will vary over time. However, the principle of coherence requires that this 
ratio should not diverge over time towards zero or infinity.74 In the actuarial literature, key 
early contributions have been made by Cairns et al. (2011b), Dowd et al. (2011), Li and Hardy 
(2011) and Börger et al. (2013).75 More recently, Villegas et al. (2017) carried out an extensive 
review of both existing and potential new multi-population models. Despite the general 
popularity of the Li and Lee (2005) model, their model has been found to be quite unsuitable 
for some actuarial applications by both Villegas et al. (2017) and Enchev et al. (2017). 
Specifically, applications that require a stochastic assessment of longevity risk (e.g., 
measurement of basis risk or diversification benefits) require models that have a plausible 
correlation term structure: the Li and Lee model fails on this criterion.76 
 
9.3.3   To satisfy the principle of coherence, Cairns et al. (2011b) make use of a mean-reverting 
stochastic spread that allows for different trends in mortality improvement rates in the short-
run, but parallel improvements in the long run. This study uses a Bayesian framework that 
allows the estimation of the unobservable state variables that determine mortality and of the 
parameters of the stochastic processes that drive those state variables to be combined into a 
single step. The key benefits of this include a dampening of the impact of Poisson variation in 
death counts,77 full allowance for parameter uncertainty, and the flexibility to deal with missing 
data.  
 
                                                 
74 As an example, the principle of coherence means that male mortality rates should 
(mostly) remain a bit higher than female mortality in the long run, and not cross over with 
certainty as can happen if single population models are fitted to each group independently. 
75 See also Jarner and Kryger (2011), Njenga and Sherris (2011), Börger and Ruß (2012), 
Zhou et al. (2014), Chen et al. (2015), Kleinow (2015), Li et al. (2015b) and Enchev et 
al. (2017). 
76 The Li and Lee model commonly predicts perfect correlation between future (log) death 
rates in two populations at very different ages. Biologically, this is highly implausible. 
77 The study uses the common assumption that individual deaths follow a Poisson 
distribution. If one of the populations is relatively small, Chen et al. (2017) show that the 
standard two-stage maximum likelihood (in contrast to the one-stage Bayesian) approach 
produces highly biased estimates of the period effect volatilities. 
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9.3.4   Dowd et al. (2011) employ a ‘gravity’ model to achieve coherence using an iterative 
estimation procedure.78 The larger population is modelled independently (similar to the 
approach recommended by Villegas et al., 2017), but the smaller population is modelled in 
terms of spreads (or deviations) relative to the evolution of the larger population. To satisfy the 
principle of coherence, the spreads in the period and cohort effects between the larger and 
smaller populations depend on gravity or spread reversion parameters for the two effects. The 
larger the two gravity parameters, the more strongly the smaller population’s mortality rates 
move in line with those of the larger population in the long run.  
 
9.3.5   In their comprehensive comparison of two-population models, Villegas et al. (2017) 
find that two models satisfy best their criteria for a good two-population model: the common 
age effect model (Kleinow, 2015) with a cohort effect added; and a variant of the CBD family 
labelled as M7-M5. Additionally, they offer useful guidance on the minimum quality of data 
for the sub-population: a minimum annual exposure of 20,000 to 25,000 lives over at least 8 to 
10 years,79 although Bayesian methods offer the potential to relax these criteria somewhat (e.g., 
Cairns et al., 2011b, 2017a, Chen et al., 2017).  
9.4 Process-based and Causal Models 
9.4.1 Until recently, these classes of models were not widely used, since the relationships 
between biomedical and causal factors and underlying death rates were not sufficiently well 
understood and because the underlying data needed to build the models were unreliable. This 
has begun to change. 
 
9.4.2   In 2012, RMS launched a series of mortality indices and models via a platform called 
RMS LifeRisks. The platform allows life insurance companies and pension funds in the UK, 
the US, France, Germany, Holland and Canada to model and manage their exposure to 
longevity and mortality risks, taking into account recent medical research and social change 
projections. There are two principal models.80 
 
9.4.3   The first model is the RMS Longevity Risk Model. This is the base model used to project 
mortality and variations in mortality during normal conditions when there are no extreme 
mortality events. The projections depend on a number of so-called ‘vitagion categories’ or 
individual sources of mortality improvement (see Figure 13). The five categories used by RMS 
are:  lifestyle trends, including smoking prevalence; health environment; medical intervention; 
regenerative medicine, such as stem cell research, gene therapy and nanomedicine; and the 
retardation of ageing, including telomere shortening and caloric restriction. 
 
9.4.4   The second model is the RMS infectious diseases model. This is used to estimate the 
additional mortality arising from the outbreak of certain infectious diseases, e.g., pandemic 
influenza. Both models were used in pricing the Kortis bond (see Section 5.2) and an outbreak 
of something like influenza would be the most likely reason for the attachment point being 
reached during the life of the bond. 
                                                 
78 See Hunt and Blake (2018) for a superior set of identification conditions for estimating 
the gravity model. 
79 Referring back to the final sentence in paragraph 9.3.1, while multi-population modelling 
is essential for index-based hedging, this can only really be done in big plans. It is also 
the case that it is only such big plans that have access to bespoke products due to their 
size. 
80 It is worth pointing out that, unlike the extrapolative or time series models, the RMS 
models have never been published or subject to independent peer review. 
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Figure 13: Timeline into the Future 
 
Note: Structural modelling of medical-based mortality improvement explores the timing, magnitude, 
and impact of different phases of new medical advances on the horizon. Source: RMS (2010) 
‘Longevity Risk’ 
 
9.4.5   Academic researchers have recently begun experimenting with the introduction of causal 
variables in their mortality models (e.g., Hanewald, 2011, Gaille and Sherris, 2011, Alai et al., 
2014a, Villegas and Haberman, 2014, Gourieroux and Lu, 2015, and Cairns et al., 2017a). 
Practitioners also started to use post code as a measure of socio-economic class (SEC) in their 
proprietary mortality models, especially for pricing annuities. An early example is Richards 
(2008).  
 
9.4.6   In 2008, Club Vita, a UK longevity data and analytics company, was set up with the 
express purpose of improving the socio-economic modelling of mortality data, allowing the 
segmentation of projections by SEC. To illustrate, cancer mortality related to smoking (such 
as larynx, oropharynx, oral cavity and lung) is more commonly associated with the lowest SEC, 
while cancer mortality related exposure to the sun (malignant melanoma) is more commonly 
associated with the highest SEC. Segmented longevity trend models have improved in recent 
years as a result of new insights from medical science and a greater understanding of cause of 
death for each SEC. The benefits of this to a pension plan have been an improved (and 
sometimes lower) best estimate of life expectancy (due to a more accurate socio-economic 
breakdown of the plan’s membership) with less uncertainty in the base table. The benefits to 
an insurer seeking new business have been refined pricing, better assessment of diversification, 
more effective risk selection, and increased competitiveness (Baxter and Wooley, 2017). 
However, there is still an ongoing debate around using trend assumptions by SEC. For example, 
Jon Palin argues: ‘The evidence is less clear on the level of historical mortality improvements 
in pension schemes and other segments of the population, and to what extent a different 
assumption should be made for them’.81  
 
9.4.7   The emergence of new multi-population datasets with socio-economic subdivisions is 
also beginning to offer much greater potential for the development of reliable and robust multi-
population models. For example, Cairns et al. (2017a) make use of Danish population data 
                                                 
81 http://www.theactuary.com/features/2017/08/mortality-improvements-in-decline/ 
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subdivided using a measure of affluence that combines wealth and income, and utilizing this 
data, they develop a 10-population CBD-type stochastic model over the age range 55 to 94. 
With 10 sub-populations to analyse, they avoid excessive model complexity by assuming a 
relatively simple model for correlations between sub-populations. A Bayesian framework is 
exploited to dampen the effect of sampling variation that is inherent in the 10 relatively small 
sub-populations. It is anticipated that in the near future this and other datasets will become 
publicly available to allow researchers to develop alternative models, as well as further road-
testing existing models. 
 
10. APPLICATIONS OF THE MORTALITY MODELS  
10.1 Overview 
In this section, we introduce some applications of the extrapolative mortality models introduced 
in the previous section: practical implementation of stochastic mortality models; determination 
of the longevity risk premium; estimating regulatory capital relief with a hedge in place; and 
comparison of alternative longevity risk management options. We begin by considering 
different types of users of these models. 
10.2 Users of Stochastic Mortality Models 
10.2.1   The following are potential users (directly or indirectly) of stochastic mortality models: 
insurers and reinsurers; regulators (e.g., the PRA); pension plans; specialist and general 
investors; actuaries and actuarial consultants; and software providers (e.g., Longevitas). 
 
10.2.2   Insurers and reinsurers have a variety of reasons for using stochastic mortality models. 
Arguably, the principal reason is that they form part of an overall package of good enterprise 
risk management alongside stochastic models for other major risks, all augmented by a range 
of appropriate stress and scenario tests. Insurers can then use stochastic models to assess their 
economic capital requirements. Closely linked to this, many insurers are moving towards the 
use of stochastic models to assess regulatory capital requirements. For example, the PRA 
strongly encourages the use of stochastic mortality models with the standard one-year horizon 
under Solvency II (Prudential Regulatory Authority, 2015, 2016). Multi-population models 
also offer the potential for insurers to assess the diversification benefits resulting from exposure 
to different portfolios of lives (males/females, smokers/non-smokers, assurances/annuities, 
multi-country, etc.), with subsequent reductions, for example, in regulatory capital. Lastly, 
insurers might wish to use stochastic models to compare different options for the management 
of longevity risk. Depending on in-house capability, insurers might develop their own suite of 
stochastic mortality models, or use external expertise. This might come in the form of ready-
to-use mortality software that is employed in-house by appropriately trained staff, or by 
contracting external consultants to perform stochastic analyses. 
 
10.2.3   Regulators will not, typically, be direct users of stochastic mortality models. However, 
they do need to be sufficiently knowledgeable in their use (including awareness of the 
assumptions and limitations of each model) in order to be able to assess how they are being 
used by life insurers. Additionally, they need to be able to give periodic guidance on the use of 
stochastic models, including which models are, or are not, acceptable (see, for example, 
Prudential Regulatory Authority, 2015, 2016). 
 
10.2.4   The acceptance of systematic longevity risk will, in general, form part of the core risk 
taking of an insurer up to a level that is consistent with its overall risk appetite. In contrast, 
acceptance of longevity risk is not generally part of the core business of the typical sponsor of 
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an occupational pension plan (nor indeed is investment and interest-rate risk). Nevertheless, 
systematic longevity risk is present and therefore requires careful attention. Large pension 
plans have the resources to assess their exposure to longevity risk through the use of both 
stochastic modelling and deterministic scenarios: again as part of a wider programme of 
integrated risk management. As with insurers, this might be done in-house, but more often this 
would be a service provided by the plan’s actuarial advisers. Smaller pension plans are less 
likely to have the financial resources to carry out a full stochastic assessment of longevity risk. 
However, there is the potential for the longevity risk research community to develop a small 
range of deterministic longevity scenarios (expressed as adjustments to the preferred best 
estimate forecast) that capture the essence of realistic extreme stochastic scenarios. On the 
other hand, consultancies now tend to have fairly streamlined processes for running off 
stochastic projections in order to illustrate the magnitude of each element of the longevity risk; 
these would typically be based on simplified benefits but would additionally reflect the most 
important aspects of the scheme, such as membership age, gender, and pension amounts. Such 
scenarios and projections should contrast favourably with the poorly formulated 20% stress 
test required under Solvency II (see Cairns and El Boukfaoui, 2018). Models, therefore, can 
help plans determine appropriate target funding levels and contribution rates, as well as assess 
the risks associated with meeting these targets. Finally, as remarked earlier, use of stochastic 
models is recommended as a way to help choose between alternative longevity risk 
management options (including retention of the risk).  
 
10.2.5 Pension plans also need to assess the potential future funding levels that might result 
from future uncertain investment returns, interest rate changes and changes in longevity. 
Stochastic mortality models can be used as part of a larger internal modelling exercise to assess 
uncertainty in funding levels. Larger plans will have the resources to carry out such an exercise. 
For smaller plans, stochastic models can again be used by actuarial consultants to generate a 
small number of deterministic, extreme scenarios that can applied to a range of smaller pension 
plans.  
 
10.2.6   Specialist and general investors in longevity risk (e.g., ILS investors, hedge funds, 
private equity investors, sovereign wealth funds, endowments and family offices) and other 
receivers of longevity risk (e.g., reinsurers) are only likely to invest in this risk if offers an 
acceptable risk premium, taking into account the low correlation between longevity risk and 
financial market risks and hence the potential diversification benefits from including longevity-
linked products in an investment portfolio. This will be reflected in the price of the transaction 
at the outset relative to a best estimate or expected value. A rigorous approach to this requires 
a set of stochastic models to assess how much risk there is around the expected payoff.82 In a 
competitive market, the size of the risk premium will reflect each potential investor’s other 
exposures: for example, a reinsurer might be satisfied with a lower risk premium for longevity 
risk if they have offsetting life assurance exposures.    
10.3   Practical Implementation of Stochastic Mortality Models 
10.3.1   It is common practice in the UK to use different methodologies for setting central 
forecasts and for risk assessment around that central forecast. For example, life insurers might 
use the CMI_2016 model (formally known as the CMI mortality projection model, calibrated 
using data up to 2016) to frame their central forecast and calculate best estimate liabilities. 
They then follow PRA guidelines (Prudential Regulatory Authority, 2015, 2016) and use 
stochastic mortality models to assess, proportionately, how much risk there is around that best 
                                                 
82 In order to deal with model risk. 
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estimate (Cairns et al., 2017b). The use of CMI_2016 allows users some control over future 
improvement rates and in key elements requires the exercise of sound judgement (e.g., in 
setting the long-term rate of improvement). This contrasts with the more objective statistical 
approach prevalent in stochastic mortality modelling. Under the stochastic approach, the 
central forecast is determined by: the choice of model; the choice of time series model (or 
equivalent) for forecasting period and cohort effects; and the historical calibration period. 
These elements are ones that can be chosen objectively using standard statistical methods (see, 
for example, Cairns et al., 2009, and Richards et al., 2017). No further judgement is required 
once these selections have been made. 
 
10.3.2   Current research is attempting to close the gap between the two approaches. For 
example, Richards et al. (2017) focus on the Age Period Cohort Improvements (APCI) model 
that underpins the historical calibration of the CMI_2016 model, and propose a coherent 
stochastic approach for forecasting. On the other hand, Cairns et al. (2017b) discuss an 
approach that closes the gap between the CMI central forecast and the mean trajectory under 
the objective statistical approach. This involves giving the user some control over setting the 
short and long term central trends in the period and cohort effects in a stochastic model. With 
some minor constraints applied to the historical calibration of the CMI model, the adapted 
stochastic model and the CMI_2016 projections can produce consistent central forecasts, 
allowing users to place greater reliance on the outputs of the stochastic model.  
10.4 Determining the Longevity Risk Premium 
10.4.1 As just discussed, the provider of any longevity hedge requires a premium to assume 
longevity risk. This means that the forward rate agreed at the start of any q-forward contract 
will be below the anticipated (expected) mortality rate on the maturity date of the contract.  
Similarly, the implied forward life expectancy in any longevity swap will be higher than the 
anticipated (expected) life expectancy. Figure 14 shows a typical relationship between the 
expected and forward mortality rate curves and the risk premium for a particular cohort 
currently aged 65.83 Figure 15 shows the same for a particular age (in this case 65-year-old 
English & Welsh males) for years 2005-25: the further into the future, the more uncertainty 
there is in the mortality rate and the bigger the risk premium. 
 
10.4.2   As remarked above, a stochastic model can be used to assess how much uncertainty 
there is in the underlying hedge instrument, and then this information can be used to determine 
an appropriate risk premium. There are different approaches to setting the price, for example: 
discounting the expected payoff at an appropriate risk-adjusted discount rate that reflects the 
assessed level of risk; or calculating a risk-adjusted expected payoff prior to discounting at the 
risk-free rate. When applied to the pricing of multiple contracts, not all frameworks will 
produce consistent prices over a range of contracts and maturities. However, the method of risk 
adjustment proposed by Cairns et al. (2006) using an explicit market price of risk for each 
period effect and for each year is one that does guarantee pricing consistency. This can be used 
to determine what might be thought of as mid-market prices, around which participants in the 
market can set buying and selling prices that reflect the degree of market illiquidity. 
 
  
                                                 
83 Loeys et al. (2007) relate the forward mortality rate to the expected mortality rate 
through the formula 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 = (1 − 𝑇𝑇. 𝛾𝛾.𝜎𝜎)𝑞𝑞𝑒𝑒, where 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 is the forward mortality rate, 𝑞𝑞𝑒𝑒 is the 
expected mortality rate, 𝑇𝑇 is the time to maturity, 𝜎𝜎 is the volatility (annualized standard 
deviation) of changes in the mortality rate , and 𝛾𝛾 is the annualized Sharpe ratio required 
by the counterparty (sometimes also referred to as the market price of risk). 
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Figure 14: Cohort Expected and Forward Mortality Rate Curves   
for a Cohort Currently Aged 65 and q-Forward Maturity at Age 75 
 
 
Figure 15: Expected and Forward Mortality Rate Curves  
for 65-year-old English & Welsh Males, 2005-25 
 
Source: Adapted from Loeys et al. (2007, Chart 9)
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10.5 Estimating Regulatory Capital Relief 
10.5.1   In Section 7.2 above, we discussed regulatory capital. Under Solvency II, an insurer’s 
regulatory capital can be reduced if its liabilities are appropriately hedged. 
 
10.5.2   This necessitates bringing the relevant regulatory authority on board sooner rather than 
later, as experience in the Netherlands shows. The Dutch financial regulator, the Dutch 
National Bank (DNB), assesses longevity hedges on a case-by-case basis. A particular case is 
insurance, pensions and investments firm Delta Lloyd’s two index-based longevity hedges.84  
Delta Lloyd had its Solvency II capital ratio reduced by 14 percentage points at the end of 2015 
following ‘intense discussions’. This was due to a disagreement with the DNB about the 
inclusion of risk margin relief on the two longevity hedges beyond the duration of the hedges. 
The DNB treats an index-based hedge as a financial instrument, whereas it treats a customized 
hedge as a reinsurance contract. It wanted the index-based hedges to be restructured to ‘ensure 
reinsurance treatment’, otherwise Delta Lloyd faced a further 7 percentage points deduction 
from its Solvency II ratio. 
 
10.5.3   In June 2016, the DNB clarified its position. It agreed that for an index-based swap, 
capital relief will be proportional to the risk transfer. However, it felt that some previous index-
based deals had been of too short duration, too out-of-the-money, and not a good match for 
actual liabilities.85 
 
10.5.4   A detailed account of how to calculate regulatory capital relief in a longevity hedge 
can be found in Cairns and El Boukfaoui (2018).86 They describe a flexible framework that 
blends practical issues with current academic modelling work. Key elements include careful 
assessment of basis risk, subdivided into population basis risk and other sources. They then 
consider a specific longevity hedge with a call option spread payoff structure and analyse the 
impact on regulatory capital. A key conclusion is that the balance between population basis 
risk and other sources of basis risk (especially structural basis risk) is highly dependent on the 
exhaustion point of the underlying option. For example, in a Solvency II setting, if the 
exhaustion point is close to the 99.5% quantile of the underlying risk, the recognition of 
population basis risk can have a significant effect on the regulatory capital required. In contrast, 
if the exhaustion point is somewhat below the 99.5% quantile (e.g., 95%), then population basis 
risk has a negligible impact on the amount of regulatory capital relief.87 In the latter case, 
therefore, the index-based hedge acts in a very similar way to a reinsurance arrangement with 
similar attachment and exhaustion points in terms of its impact on regulatory capital. The 
authors conclude that hedgers need to consider carefully the terms of an index-based hedge (in 
the case considered, the attachment and exhaustion points, and the maturity date), to ensure the 
                                                 
84 See Section 11 below. 
85 See: Pigott and Walker (2016); Solvency II Troubleshoot: Longevity Swaps and Risk 
Margin Relief, InsuranceERM, 17 May 2016;  
https://www.insuranceerm.com/analysis/solvency-ii-troubleshoot-longevity-swaps-and-
risk-margin-relief.html 
86 With or without regulatory capital requirements, their methodology can be applied 
equally well (and, arguably, more cleanly) to economic capital relief using an insurer’s own 
economic capital framework and risk appetite. 
87 For the examples in Cairns and El Boukfaoui (2018) if the exhaustion point is at the 
99.5% quantile, the inclusion of population basis risk can reduce regulatory capital relief 
by around 15% to 20%. In contrast, if the exhaustion point is at the 95% quantile, the 
impact on regulatory capital relief of population basis risk is effectively zero as the hedge 
always pays off in full in the most extreme 0.5% of scenarios. 
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best outcome. Further, in light of the evidence in the previous two paragraphs, insurers should 
simultaneously discuss their plans with their local regulator before proceeding with a hedge. 
Bearing this in mind, Cairns and El Boukfaoui (2018) outline a clear set of steps that can be 
used to document regulatory capital relief calculations with the recommendation that these 
steps be followed as a way to facilitate discussions with local regulators. This includes a 
requirement to document clearly the structure of the two-population stochastic mortality model, 
how this is calibrated, how death rates get extrapolated to high ages, and how central forecasts 
will be determined at future valuation dates incorporating new information up to that valuation 
date.  
 
10.6 Comparison of Risk Management Options 
Good risk management practice includes consideration of a variety of viable options for 
reducing exposure to longevity risk, and stochastic models have a key quantitative role, 
alongside qualitative criteria, in the process that leads to choosing one option over another. 
Cairns (2014) outlines some of the issues. The stochastic model can be used in a consistent 
way to evaluate a hedger’s longevity risk profile with and without each of the hedging options 
in place. The range of options itself might be constrained by the size of the liability to be hedged 
(for example, customized longevity swaps have typically been restricted to larger pension 
plans) but should, in the first instance, include both customized and index-based hedges. Any 
analysis should also take into account a hedger’s exposure to idiosyncratic risk. Once residual 
risk has been evaluated, the hedger is then in a position to compare the different options. This 
should take into account the hedger’s general risk appetite as well as the underlying premium 
for a hedge (Section 10.4) and future requirements for adjustments to the hedge (e.g. a buy-in 
used prior to a full buy-out). Cairns (2014) discusses, in a stylized fashion, how these multiple 
inputs can result in different final decisions: one size does not fit all.88 
 
 
11.   DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LONGEVITY RISK TRANSFER MARKET SINCE 2006 
 
11.1   As mentioned at the beginning of this article, the global longevity de-risking market 
began in the UK in 2006. Prior to this time, the UK market was dominated by two life assurers, 
Prudential89 and Legal & General (L&G), which did business of approximately £2bn a year 
across a large number of small transactions. The total potential size of the UK market alone is 
around £2.7trn (on a buy-out basis) and this encouraged a raft of new players, in particular 
mono-line insurers, to enter the market.90 The first of these was Paternoster, but others quickly 
followed including Pension Insurance Corporation (PIC), Synesis91 and Lucida,92 all of which 
were backed by investment banks and private equity investors. In 2007, Goldman Sachs 
established its own pension insurer, Rothesay Life. Paternoster93 executed the first buy-out in 
                                                 
88 For example, a highly risk averse hedger will normally opt for a customized hedge, 
whereas a hedger with a greater appetite for risk might favour an index-based hedge if 
the price is right. 
89 We will use Prudential to refer to the UK-based insurer. 
90 The timing was motivated by a number of external factors, such as a strengthened 
funding standard, increased accounting transparency of pension liabilities on corporate 
balance sheets, the establishment of the PPF with risk-based levies that depended on the 
size of plan deficits, and the beginning of the closure of defined benefit pension plans. 
91 Acquired by PIC in 2008. 
92 Acquired by L&G in 2013. 
93 Acquired by Rothesay Life in 2011. 
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November 2006 of the Cuthbert Heath Family Plan, a small UK plan with just 33 members. It 
also executed the first pensioner buy-in with Hunting PLC in January 2007.94 
 
11.2   The world's first publicly announced longevity swap between Swiss Re and the UK life 
office Friends' Provident in April 2007 (although this was structured as an insurance or 
indemnification contract rather than a capital market transaction). 2007 also saw the release of 
the LifeMetrics Indices covering England & Wales, the US, Holland and Germany by J.P. 
Morgan, the Pensions Institute and Willis Towers Watson (WTW) (then Towers Watson).95 
Xpect Age and Cohort Indices were launched in March 2008 by Deutsche Börse.96 These 
indices cover, respectively, life expectancy at different ages and survival rates for given cohorts 
of lives in England & Wales, the US, Holland, and Germany and its regions. The purpose of 
these indices is to provide a benchmark for the trading of longevity-linked instruments. In 2009, 
longevity swaps began to be offered to the market based on Deutsche Börse’s Xpect Cohort 
Indices. 
 
11.3   The world’s first capital market derivative transaction, a q-forward (or mortality forward) 
contract,97 between J. P. Morgan and the UK pension fund buy-out company Lucida, took place 
in January 2008. The world’s first capital market longevity swap was executed in July 2008: 
Canada Life hedged £500m of its UK-based annuity book (purchased from the defunct UK life 
insurer Equitable Life). This was a 40-year swap customized to the insurer’s longevity 
exposure to 125,000 annuitants. The longevity risk was fully transferred to investors, which 
included hedge funds and ILS funds. J. P. Morgan acted as the intermediary and assumes 
counter-party credit risk. In August 2011, ITV, the UK’s largest commercial TV producer, 
completed a £1.7bn bespoke longevity swap with Credit Suisse for its £2.2bn pension plan: the 
cost of the swap is reported as £50m (3% of the notional swap value).98 In February 2010, 
Mercer launched a pension buy-out index for the UK to track the cost charged by insurance 
companies to buy out corporate pension liabilities: at the time of launch, the cost was some 
44% higher than the accounting value of the liabilities99 which highlights the attraction of using 
cheaper alternatives, such as longevity swaps, to transfer longevity.100  
 
11.4   On 1 February 2010, the Life and Longevity Markets Association (LLMA) was 
established in London. Its current members are Aviva, AXA, Deutsche Bank, J.P. Morgan, 
Morgan Stanley, Prudential, and Swiss Re. LLMA was formed to promote the development of 
a liquid market in longevity- and mortality-related risks.  
                                                 
94 See Appendix A for a full list of publicly announced UK buy-ins between 2007 and 2016. 
95 Coughlan et al. (2007).  
96 www.deutsche-boerse.com/xpect_e 
97  Coughlan et al. (2007b). 
98https://www.professionalpensions.com/professional-pensions/news/2104113/gbp17bn-
itv-deal-predicted-spark-longevity-swaps-surge 
99 https://www.uk.mercer.com/newsroom/global-buyout-index.html. In October 2017, 
the cost was 39% higher (Mercer Global Pension Buyout Index December 2017, 
https://www.mercer.com/content/dam/mercer/attachments/global/Retirement/monthly-
report/gl-2017-mercer-global-pension-buyout-index-december.pdf) 
100 The buy-out offloads all risks (i.e., including investment, inflation, interest rate and 
longevity risks) which explains, in part, the higher costs. A closer comparison to a longevity 
swap is a buy-in, since both just offload longevity risk. In October 2017, the cost of a buy-
in was 13% higher than the accounting value of the liability and 7% higher than the 
funding value of the liability, reflecting the way that funding assumptions are generally 
more best-estimate than accounting assumptions (Mercer Global Pension Buyout Index 
December 2017). 
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11.5 This market is related to the ILS market and is also similar to other markets with trend 
risks, e.g., the market in inflation-linked securities and derivatives. LLMA aims to support the 
development of consistent standards, methodologies and benchmarks to help build a liquid 
trading market needed to support the future demand for longevity protection by insurers and 
pension funds. In April 2011, the LifeMetrics indices were transferred to LLMA with the aim 
of establishing a global benchmark for trading longevity and mortality risk. 
 
11.6   In December 2010, building on its successful mortality catastrophe Vita bonds and taking 
into account the lessons learned from the failed EIB/BNP longevity bond, Swiss Re launched 
an eight-year longevity-spread bond valued at $50m. To do this, it used a special purpose 
vehicle, Kortis Capital, based in the Cayman Islands. As with the mortality bonds, the 
longevity-spread bonds are designed to hedge Swiss Re's own exposure to mortality and 
longevity risk. In particular, holders of the bonds face a reduction in principal if there is an 
increase in the spread between mortality improvements in 75-85-year-old English & Welsh 
males and 55-65-year-old US males, indicating that Swiss Re has life insurance (mortality risk) 
exposure in the US and pension (longevity risk) exposure in the UK.101 
 
11.7   The world’s first longevity swap for non-pensioners (i.e., for active and deferred 
members of a pension plan) took place in January 2011, when J. P. Morgan executed a £70m 
10-year q-forward contract with the Pall (UK) pension fund. This was a value swap designed 
to hedge the longevity risk in the value of Pall’s pension liabilities, rather than the longevity 
risk in its pension payments as in the case of cash flow swaps – which have been the majority 
of the swaps that have so far taken place. Longevity risk prior to retirement is all valuation risk: 
there is no cash flow risk and most of the risk lies in the forecasts of mortality improvements 
at specific future valuation dates. Further, the longevity exposure of deferreds is not well 
defined as a result of the options that plan members have.  
 
11.8   In 2011, WTW introduced the pension captive structure. A plan executes a pensioner 
buy-in with a standard insurer,102 but then the insurer reinsures the buy-in with a captive insurer 
owned by the sponsor. Captives can provide a cost-effective solution compared with either a 
traditional buy-in or directly running the plan over the longer term. This is because there can 
be a more efficient blending of investment management services with insurance, combined 
with a more effective disaggregation of risks and hence a more capital-efficient management 
of those risks. The first plan to use this structure was Coca Cola in 2011 (Willis Towers Watson, 
2017). 
 
11.9   In December 2011, Long Acre Life entered the market to offer cheaper pension insurance 
solutions to larger plans with liabilities above £500m. Under these solutions companies offload 
their pension plans to an insurance vehicle in which they also invest and so share the profits 
along with external investors: the target return is 15% p.a.103 In January 2012, L&G began 
offering longevity insurance (in the form of deferred buy-ins) for the 1,000 or so smaller plans 
with liabilities in the range £50-£250m. In February 2012, UK pension consultant Punter 
Southall adopted PensionsFirst’s pension liability and risk management software (PFaroe) to 
automate the production of actuarial valuations and hence cut costs for pension plans, 
                                                 
101 The Kortis bond is analyzed in Hunt and Blake (2015). 
102 The standard insurer needs to be UK regulated, the captive is off-shore; the standard 
insurer will have the modelling skills etc, while the captive is effectively an empty shell. 
103 This proposition failed to attract sufficient commercial interest and the company was 
dissolved in January 2016. 
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particularly small ones. In the same month, another UK consultant Hymans Robertson, 
launched a pension de-risking monitoring service which compares the costs of a full buy-out 
with the costs of a buy-in covering only pensioner members and the costs of a longevity swap.   
 
11.10   The first pension risk transfers deals outside the UK took place in 2009-11. The first 
buy-in deal outside the UK was in 2009 in Canada; it was arranged by Sun Life Financial and 
valued at C$50m. The first buy-in deal in Europe was in December 2010 between the Dutch 
food manufacturer Hero and the Dutch insurer Aegon (€44m). The first buy-in deal in the US 
(valued at $75m) took place in May 2011 between Hickory Springs Manufacturing Company 
and the Prudential Insurance Co of America (PICA).104 The first buy-out deal outside the UK 
was announced in May 2011 and involved the C$2.5bn Nortel pension plan in Canada. In 
September 2011, CAMRADATA Analytical Services launched a new pension risk transfer 
(PRT) database for US pension plans. The database provides insurance company organisational 
information, pension buy-in and buy-out product fact sheets and screening tools, pricing data, 
up-to-date information on each PRT provider's financial strength and relevant industry 
research. Users can request pension buy-in and buy-out quotes directly from providers, 
including American General Life Companies, MetLife, Pacific Life, Principal Financial Group, 
PICA, Transamerica and United of Omaha. 
 
11.11   The first international longevity reinsurance transaction took place in June 2011 
between Rothesay Life (UK) and PICA (US) and was valued at £100m. The first life book 
reinsurance swap since the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-08 also took place in June 2011 
between Atlanticlux and institutional investors and was valued at €60m.  
11.12   In February 2012, Deutsche Bank (through its insurance subsidiary Abbey Life) 
executed a huge €12bn index-based longevity swap for insurer Aegon in the Netherlands. This 
solution was based on Dutch national population data and enabled Aegon to hedge the 
liabilities associated with a portion of its annuity book (of €30bn). Deutsche Bank pays floating 
payments associated with the realized mortality rates of the reference index, but these payments 
are capped and floored. Aegon pays fixed premiums. The maturity of the swap is 20 years. A 
commutation mechanism determines the payment at maturity – the mechanism is designed to 
provide longevity protection for liability cashflows occurring beyond the 20-year maturity 
point. The swap has the structure of a series of call option spreads each with a long out-of-the 
money call at a strike price (or floor) and a short out-of-the money call at a higher strike price 
(or cap). Because the swap began deep out of the money (i.e., the floor is considerably higher 
than initial mortality rates), the amount of longevity risk actually transferred is far less than 
that suggested by the €12bn notional amount. Nonetheless, the key driver for this transaction 
from Aegon’s point of view was the reduction in regulatory capital it achieved. Most of the 
longevity risk has been passed to investors in the form of private bonds and swaps.105   
 
11.13   In June 2012, General Motors Co. (GM) announced a massive deal to transfer up to 
$26bn of pension obligations to PICA. This is by far the largest ever pension and longevity risk 
transfer deal globally. The transaction is effectively a partial pension buy-out involving the 
purchase of a group annuity contract for GM’s salaried retirees who retired before 1 December 
                                                 
104 We will use PICA to refer to the US-based insurer, which is a Prudential Financial, Inc. 
company, as well as Prudential Retirement and Prudential Retirement Insurance and 
Annuity Company (PRIAC). 
105 
https://www.cass.city.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/141587/Sagoo_Douglas_prese
ntation.pdf 
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2011 and refused a lump sum offer in 2012. To the extent retirees accepted a lump sum payment 
in lieu of future pension payments, the longevity risk was transferred directly to the retiree.106 
The deal was classified as a partial buy-out rather than a buy-in because it involved the 
settlement of the obligation. In other words, the portion of the liabilities associated with the 
annuity contract will no longer be GM’s obligation. Moreover, in contrast to a buy-in, the 
annuity contract will not be an asset of the pension plan, but instead an asset of the retirees. In 
October 2012, Verizon Communications executed a $7.5bn bulk annuity buy-in with PICA. 
The total buy-out deals market in the U.S. in 2012 amounted to $36bn.  
 
11.14   The UK buy-outs for private sector pension plans had all involved plans that were 
closed to future accrual. However, in March 2012, PIC executed the first buy-out of a plan 
open to future accrual: the sponsoring employer, the high-tech manufacturer Denso, will pay 
PIC an annual premium based on the number of active members and their salaries, but PIC will 
assume all the liabilities. PIC had previously conducted an innovative buy-in in May 2011 with 
the London Stock Exchange’s defined benefit pension plan which not only insured current 
pensioner members, but will also automatically insure active and deferred members when they 
reach retirement.   
 
11.15   In June 2012, the OECD released the first edition of Pensions Outlook. This called on 
governments to kick-start the creation of a functioning longevity risk market and consider 
issuing longevity bonds, without which the annuity market is unlikely to work well. In 
September 2012, Swiss Re Europe released a report entitled A mature market: Building a 
capital market for longevity risk. The report called for the development of a capital market for 
longevity risk. It said that ‘Society's longevity risk could be tackled to a greater extent if 
reinsurers were able to expand their capacity, and this could be done by encouraging capital 
market investors to invest in longevity instruments. …The main challenges include achieving 
transparency in measuring the risk and potential liability, building a secondary market, 
increasing investor education, providing the right level of return and regulation’.107  
 
11.16   In December 2012, the enhanced buy-in market opened for business in the UK for 
defined benefit pension plans. An enhanced buy-in is where a plan’s trustees buy a group 
annuity as an investment of the plan, where some or all of the members covered by the policy 
are medically underwritten. Medical underwriting, which is now commonplace in the 
individual annuity market (i.e., in relation to defined contribution pensions), has the potential 
to reduce the cost to the plan of the longevity hedge compared with standard annuities, on the 
grounds that certain members might have lower than average life expectancy as a result of their 
lifestyle or some serious life-shortening illness. The market was introduced by two specialist 
insurers, Partnership and Just Retirement, but other larger insurers followed, e.g., L&G which 
offers a Large Individual Defined Benefit Annuity (LIBDA) service. 
 
11.17   In February 2013, the first medically underwritten bulk annuity (MUBA) transaction 
was executed in the UK by Partnership (Harrison and Blake, 2013). This involved each member 
filling in a medical questionnaire in order to get a more accurate assessment of their life 
expectancy based on their medical history or lifestyle. This was particularly useful in the case 
of ‘top slicing’, where plan trustees insure the pensioners (who will typically be the company 
directors) with the largest liabilities and who therefore represent a disproportionate risk 
                                                 
106 In fact, the lump sum was only offered to limited cohorts of plan members. 
107 
http://www.swissre.com/media/news_releases/nr_20120924_capital_market_longevity.
html 
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concentration for the plan. In December 2014, Partnership executed a £206m medically 
underwritten bulk annuity transaction with a top slicing arrangement for the £2bn Taylor 
Wimpey pension plan. L&G transacted a £230m medically-underwritten buy-in in December 
2015 with the Kingfisher Pension Scheme, covering 149 high-value members. The process of 
collecting medical information has been streamlined in recent years using third-party medical 
data collectors, such as MorganAsh, Age Partnership and Aon’s AHEAD platform – the first 
two of which also perform MUMS (medically underwritten mortality studies). New business 
more than doubled from £540m in 2014 to £1,200m in 2015, i.e., from 5% to 12.5% of the 
market (Hunt and Blake, 2016). In April 2016, the two largest UK medical underwriters, 
Partnership and Just Retirement – which both entered the market in 2012 – merged to form Just 
valued at £16bn. In December 2016, Just executed a £110m medically underwritten buy-in 
with the Land Securities Group of Companies' defined benefit pension fund. 
11.18   In April 2013, L&G reported its first non-UK deal, the buy-out of a €136m annuity 
book from New Ireland Life. In June 2013, the Canadian Wheat Board executed a C$150m 
pension buy-in from Sun Life of Canada, involving inflation-linked annuities, while in March 
2014, an unnamed Canadian company purchased C$500m of annuities from an insurer reported 
to be Industrial Alliance, making it the largest ever Canadian pension risk transfer deal to date.  
11.19   In August 2013, Numerix, a risk management and derivatives valuation company, 
introduced a new asset class called ‘life’ on its risk modelling platform (in addition to equities, 
bonds and commodities).  
11.20   In September 2013, UK consultant Barnett Waddingham launched an insurer 
financial strength review service which provides information on an insurer’s structure, 
solvency position, credit rating, and key risks in their business model. This service was 
introduced in response to concerns about the financial strength of some buy-out insurers.  
11.21   In November 2013, SPX Corp. of Charlotte, NC, purchased a buy-out contract with 
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. as part of a deal that moved $800m in pension 
obligations off SPX’s balance sheet.  
11.22   Also in November 2013, Deutsche Bank introduced the Longevity Experience Option 
(LEO). It is structured as an out-of-the-money bull call option spread on 10-year forward 
survival rates and has a 10-year maturity. The survival rates are based on males and females in 
five-year age cohorts (between 50 to 79) derived from the England & Wales and Netherlands 
LLMA longevity indices. LEOs are traded over-the-counter under a standard ISDA contract. 
They allow longevity risk to be transferred between pension funds, insurance companies and 
investors. They are intended to provide a cheaper and more liquid alternative to bespoke 
longevity swaps which are generally costly and time consuming to implement. Purchasers of 
the option spread, such as a pension fund, will gain if realized survival rates are higher than the 
forward rates, but the gains will be limited, thereby providing some comfort to the investors 
providing the longevity hedge. The 10-year maturity is the maximum that Deutsche Bank 
believed investors will tolerate in the current stage in the development of a market in longevity 
risk transfers. It was reported that Deutsche Bank executed its first LEO transaction with an 
ILS fund in January 2014.108  
                                                 
108https://www.professionalpensions.com/professional-
pensions/news/2305081/deutsche-bank-launches-longevity-swap-alternative; 
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11.23   In December 2013, Aegon executed a second longevity risk transfer to capital markets 
investors and reinsurers, including SCOR. Société Générale was the intermediary in the deal 
covering liabilities of €1.4bn and RMS was the modelling agent. The main difference with the 
Deutsche Bank hedge is that there is a single payment by Société Générale to Aegon if the 
swap is in-the-money at maturity (see Section 5.5).  
11.24    Also in December 2013, the Joint Forum reported on the results of its consultation 
on the longevity risk transfer market. It concluded that this market is not yet big enough to raise 
systemic concerns, but ‘their massive potential size and growing interest from investment 
banks to mobilize this risk make it important to ensure that these markets are safe, both on a 
prudential and systemic level’ (Joint Forum, 2013, p.2).  
11.25   In February 2014, the Mercer Global Pension Buy-out Index was introduced. It shows 
the benchmark prices of 18 independent third-party insurers in four countries with significant 
interest in buying out defined benefit liabilities: UK, US, Canada and Ireland. Costs were 
highest in the UK where the cost of insuring £100m of pension liabilities was 123% of the 
accounting value of the liabilities109 – equivalent to a price of £32 per £1 p.a. of pension 
(Towers Watson, 2015). The comparable costs in Ireland, the US and Canada were 117%, 
108.5% and 105%, respectively. The higher cost in the UK is in part due to the greater degree 
of inflation uprating of pensions in payment in the UK compared with the other countries. The 
difference between the US and Canada is explained by the use of different mortality tables. 
Rising interest rates (following the unwinding of global quantitative easing programmes) and 
equity markets will lower funding deficits and hence lead to lower buy-out costs in future, 
especially in the US.  
 
11.26   In July 2014, Mercer and Zurich launched Streamlined Longevity Solution, a longevity 
swap hedge for smaller pension plans with liabilities above £50m. This is part of a new Mercer 
SmartDB service which provides bespoke longevity de-risking solutions and involves a panel 
of reinsurers led by Zurich. It reduces the costs by having standardized processes for 
quantifying the longevity risk in each pension plan. The first deal, valued at £90m, was 
transacted with an unnamed UK pension plan in December 2015. A second deal – this time 
with the UK pension plan of the Italian tyre company Pirelli – was executed in August 2016 
for £600m. 
 
11.27   There is evidence of increasing demand from reinsurance companies for exposure to 
large books of pension annuity business to offset the risk in their books of life insurance.110 For 
example, in July 2014, Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway agreed to a £780m quota-
reinsurance deal with PIC. Similarly, in August 2014, Delta Lloyd executed a 6-year index-
                                                 
http://www.artemis.bm/blog/2013/11/04/first-longevity-experience-option-to-be-
traded-by-deutsche-bank-by-year-end/ 
109 Note from paragraph 11.3 above that the UK buy-out premium was 44% in February 
2010 and 39% in October 2017, indicating how volatile the premium can be and the 
importance of getting the timing of the buy-out right to minimize costs. 
110 The biggest buyers of longevity risk at the present time are global reinsurers. 
Nevertheless, according to Hannover Re: ‘The number of risk-takers is limited and there 
is not unlimited capacity in the market for taking on longevity risk. The increasing 
worldwide demand for longevity cover will challenge the capacity for securing longevity 
risk’ (quoted in Punter Southall, 2015). 
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based longevity swap covering €12 billion of its longevity reserves with RGA Re,111 while 
AXA France executed a €750m longevity swap with Hannover Re.  
 
11.28   In March 2014, L&G announced the biggest single buy-out in the UK to date when it 
took on £3bn of assets and liabilities from ICI’s pension plan, a subsidiary of AkzoNobel. The 
deal uses ‘umbrella’ contracts which enables the plan to add further liabilities onto the original 
contract.112 In December 2014, L&G announced the largest ever UK buy-in valued at £2.5bn 
with US manufacturer TRW. In fact, in 2014, TRW became the first global corporation to 
simultaneously complete three de-risking transactions in three different countries: the UK, the 
US and Canada. Also in 2014, the Aviva Staff Pension Scheme completed the first limited 
recourse longevity swap, involving £5 billion in liabilities and 19,000 participants.  
 
11.29   Around £13bn of bulk annuity deals were executed in the UK in 2014, the largest 
volume of business since the de-risking market began in 2006 and beating the previous best 
year of 2008, just before the GFC, when £7.9bn of deals were completed. The total volume of 
de-risking deals in the UK in 2014 alone (covering buy-outs, buy-ins and longevity swaps) was 
£35bn. Included in this sum is the UK’s largest transaction to date, namely the longevity swap 
for the British Telecom (BT) Pension Scheme, covering £16bn of pension liabilities, arranged 
by PICA in July 2014. To complete the transaction, the BT scheme created its own captive 
insurer located in Guernsey, which insured the longevity risk. The captive insurer then 
reinsured the risk in a fully collateralized arrangement with PICA. This was the world’s first 
ever pension longevity captive transaction. Captive and limited recourse transactions have 
dominated the market since. 
 
11.30   In December 2014, WTW launched Longevity Direct, an off-shore longevity swap 
hedging service that gives medium-sized pension plans with liabilities between £1-3bn direct 
access to the reinsurance market, via its own cell (or captive) insurance company. This allows 
plans to bypass (or pass through) insurers and investment banks – the traditional de-risking 
intermediaries – and significantly reduces transactions costs and completion times, while still 
getting the best possible reinsurance pricing. The first reported transaction on the Longevity 
Direct platform was the £1.5bn longevity swap executed by the Merchant Navy Officers 
Pension Fund (MNOPF) in January 2015 which was insured by MNOPF IC, a newly 
established cell insurance company based in Guernsey, and then reinsured with Pacific Life 
Re. In February 2015, PwC launched a similar off-shore longevity swap service for pension 
plans as small as £250m. It uses a Guernsey-based incorporated cell company called Iccaria, 
established by Artex Risk Solutions, to pass longevity risk directly on to reinsurers. The 
arrangement is fully collateralized and each plan owns a cell within Iccaria which again avoids 
the costs of dealing with insurer and investment bank intermediaries. WTW also introduced 
the first tracking software system to follow live insurer pricing, sending alerts when a plan 
closes in on a target price. 
 
11.31   In response to the announcement by the UK finance minister (George Osborne) in his 
Budget Speech on 19 April 2014, that UK pension plan members no longer needed to buy 
annuities when they retired (which resulted in an immediate fall in annuity sales of more than 
                                                 
111 http://www.artemis.bm/blog/2014/08/22/delta-lloyd-in-eur-12-billion-index-based-
longevity-swap-with-rga-re/ 
112 By October 2016, the ICI plan had completed 11 such deals – with L&G, Prudential 
(UK) and Scottish Widows – with a total value of £8bn, saving the parent company over 
£100m in costs. 
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50%), a number of traditional annuity providers, such as Scottish Widows, reported that they 
were considering entering the bulk annuity market. 
11.32   In November 2014, the Longevity Basis Risk Working Group (2014) of the Institute & 
Faculty of Actuaries (IFoA) and LLMA published Longevity Basis Risk: A Methodology for 
Assessing Basis Risk.113 This study develops a new framework for insurers and pension plans 
to assess longevity basis risk. This, in turn, will enable simpler, more standardized and easier 
to execute index-based longevity swaps to be implemented. Index-based longevity swaps allow 
insurers and pension plans to offset the systemic risk of increased liabilities resulting from 
members living longer than expected. It had hitherto been difficult to assess how effectively an 
index-based longevity swap could reduce the longevity risk in a particular insurance book or 
pension plan. The methodology they developed is applicable to both large plans (which are 
able to use their own mortality data in their models) and smaller plans (by capturing 
demographic differences such as socio-economic class and deprivation). In May 2016, a 
follow-up study – carried out by Macquarie University, Mercer Australia, and the University 
of Waterloo – was announced. The purpose was to design a ‘readily applicable methodology’ 
for use with longevity risk indices: ‘Such indices are often used in pension benefits and 
annuitant liabilities, as well as in providing actuaries with key data, …but the problem of the 
existence of basis risk remains unsolved’. This follow-up study was published in December 
2017 (Li et al., 2017). The report distinguishes between three types of basis risk (population, 
sampling and structural basis risk) and takes the proposed models in the 2014 report through 
to full analysis of hedge effectiveness. The report contains extensive numerical analyses that 
consider how hedge effectiveness depends on a range of input variables, including different 
book populations, size of book population, and type of hedge instrument, as well as the 
sensitivity to the underlying risk measure itself. 
11.33  In March 2015, the UK government announced that it would introduce a new 
competitive corporate tax structure to allow ILSs to be domiciled in the UK. In May 2015, 
Rothesay Life, the insurance company owned by Goldman Sachs, bought out the liabilities of 
Lehman Brothers' UK pension plan for £675m, thereby securing the pensions of former 
employees of the company associated with the beginning of the GFC.  
 
11.34   In April 2015, Swiss Re Capital Markets led the issuance of  €285m of excess mortality 
insurance-linked securities by Benu Capital Limited (Benu) on behalf of AXA Global Life. 
Swiss Re Capital Markets underwrote the transaction via two classes of principal-at-risk 
variable rate notes issued by Benu, an Irish private company incorporated with limited liability. 
The notes have a five-year risk period starting on 1 January 2015. The proceeds of the notes 
each collateralize a counterparty contract with AXA Global Life, providing protection against 
excess mortality in France, Japan and the US via country age and gender weighted population 
mortality indices. It was the largest excess mortality issuance since 2007.114 
11.35   The largest buy-out to date in the UK was for the Philips Pension Fund which in 
November 2015 completed a full buy-out of the pension benefits of 26,000 members valued at 
£2.4bn with PIC. An interesting feature of this deal was that a buy-out was combined with a 
longevity hedge. The longevity risk was simultaneously reinsured with Hannover Re. Another 
                                                 
113 A version of this report was subsequently published as Villegas et al. (2017). 
114 
http://www.swissre.com/media/news_releases/nr_20150428_large_excess_mortality_is
suance.html 
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interesting feature was that it covered both retired and deferred members, with the latter’s 
benefits valued at £1bn. 
 
11.36   An important new longevity-linked product that recently took off in the UK was the 
equity release mortgage. This allows individuals to release equity in their homes to fund their 
retirement without downsizing. L&G, for example, set up L&G Home Finance for this purpose 
and in its first year completed more than £400m equity release mortgage sales. Since equity 
release contracts typically involve a no negative equity guarantee,115 the product provider is 
exposed to the risk that mortgagors live longer than expected.  
 
11.37   In 2015, L&G directly entered both the US and European pension risk transfer markets. 
It executed a $450m transaction with the US subsidiary of Royal Philips covering 7,000 plan 
members in October and a €200m deal with ASR Nederland NV, a Dutch insurer in December. 
The pension obligations were transferred to L&G Re in cooperation with Hannover Re. L&G 
said: ‘The pension risk transfer market has become a global business…The potential market 
for pension risk transfer in the US, UK and Europe is huge, and will play out over many 
decades’. Two US insurers were also involved in the Royal Philips deal: PICA acquired $450m 
of plan liabilities covering another 7,000 members, while American United Life Insurance 
Company issued annuity contracts to 3,000 deferred plan members, valued at $200m. 
 
11.38   In January 2015, the Bell Canada Pension Plan executed a C$5bn longevity swap with 
Sun Life Financial,116 SCOR, and RGA Re; it was SCOR’s first transaction in North America. 
In the process, Canada became the first country apart from the UK to have all three pension 
risk transfer solutions actively in use.  In the same year, it completed its first inflation-linked 
buy-in annuity transaction, while in 2017 it completed its first buy-in annuity covering active 
future benefits.117 In June 2015, Delta Lloyd did a second €12bn longevity swap with RGA Re: 
the swap was also index-based, with an 8-year duration and had a notional value of €350m.118 
In July 2015, Aegon did one valued at €6bn with Canada Life Re, a new entrant to the de-
risking market in 2015. Another new entrant was Scottish Widows. 
 
11.39   In June 2015, the Mercer Pension Risk Exchange was launched. It gives clients in the 
US, UK and Canada up to date buy-in and buy-out pricing based on their plan’s data. It collects 
prices provided monthly by insurers in the bulk market, based on plan benefit structures and 
member data. Mercer said: ‘Many companies have the appetite to transfer pension risk off their 
balance sheet, but they face barriers: lack of clear information about the true cost of a buy-in 
or buy-out, limited transparency, the fluctuation of market rates and plan economics to name 
but a few. [The exchange will enable] sponsoring employers and trustees to be more strategic 
and sophisticated in their approach and to know that they are executing a buy-in or a buy-out 
at the best time for them and at a competitive price’. 
 
11.40   In April 2016, WTW released PulseModel which uses medical science and the opinions 
of medical experts to improve longevity predictions. For example, the model predicts that 16% 
of 50-year-old men in the UK will develop type-2 diabetes in the next 20 years, but this rises 
                                                 
115 That is, the amount that the individual or their estate (if the individual dies) needs to 
repay (i.e., amount borrowed plus accrued interest) cannot exceed the equity in the home. 
116 Sun Life Financial uses the RMS Longevity Risk Model, which RMS describes as a 
‘structural meta-model of geroscience advancement’. 
117 Eckler Consultants (2017) Pension Risk Transfer Report, November. 
118http://www.artemis.bm/blog/2015/06/26/delta-lloyd-rga-in-second-e12-billion-
longevity-swap-deal/ 
 57 
to 50% for those who are both obese and heavy smokers. Overall, the model predicts that 
longevity improvements in the future will be lower than currently predicted, at around 1% p.a. 
rather than 1.5%. If this turned out to be correct, then the current price of longevity of risk 
transfer products would be too high.  
 
11.41 In 2016, there were a total of £8.6bn in buy-outs and buy-ins and £1.6bn in longevity 
swaps.119  
 
11.42   The largest buy-in in 2016 (in December) was Phoenix Life’s £1.2bn buy-in for the 
4,400 pensioners in the PGL Pension Scheme, which is sponsored by the Phoenix Group, 
Phoenix Life’s parent company. This replaced a longevity swap it had set up for the plan in 
2014. This is the first example of a transaction which transforms a longevity swap into a bulk 
annuity. Phoenix Life saw this as an opportunity to bring £1.2bn of liquid assets (mostly UK 
government bonds) onto its balance sheet, which could then be swapped into a higher yielding, 
matching portfolio, structured to maximize the capital benefit under Solvency II. This, in turn, 
meant that Phoenix Life would be assuming the market risks associated with the PGL scheme 
pension liabilities in addition to the longevity risks – and already does this on its existing book 
of individual annuities which are backed by £12bn of assets.  The timing was also critical. 
Phoenix wanted to ensure that its internal model under Solvency II had bedded down well and 
that the capital and balance sheet impacts of the transaction were well understood, and that 
Phoenix had elicited the full support of the PRA for the transaction, thereby ensuring execution 
certainty. Phoenix also provided comfort to the plan’s trustees by giving them ‘all-risks' cover 
from point of buy-in (‘all-risks' cover is not usually provided until buy-out) and strong 
collateral protection.120 
11.43   2016 saw the beginning of a trend towards consolidation amongst insurance companies 
involved in the longevity risk transfer business in the UK. For example, Aegon sold its £9bn 
UK annuity portfolio to Rothesay Life121 and L&G between April and May, as part of a strategy 
to free up capital from non-core businesses. Part of the reason for this is the additional capital 
requirements under Solvency II.122 Similarly, in September, Deutsche Bank sold its Abbey Life 
subsidiary to Phoenix Life – a consolidator of closed insurance books – for £935mn, as part of 
a planned programme of disposals aimed at restoring its capital base. There is an estimated 
£100bn of UK individual annuities in back books and further consolidation of these back books 
is anticipated. In December 2017, L&G sold its £33bn closed book of traditional insurance-
based pensions, savings and investment policies to the ReAssure division of Swiss Re for 
£650m. 
11.44   Solvency II has also been blamed for some companies pulling out of the bulk annuities 
market altogether, a key example being Prudential in January 2016. Prudential is reported to 
be selling a portion of its £45bn UK annuity and pension liability businesses due to an 
                                                 
119 Pensionfundsonline, 15 December 2016. 
120 Stephanie Baxter (2017) How PGL's longevity swap was converted into a buy-in, 
Professional Pensions, 10 April. 
121 In August 2017, Goldman Sachs sold its remaining stake in Rothesay Life to a 
consortium comprising US buy-out firm Blackstone, Singapore's sovereign wealth fund 
GIC, and US life insurer MassMutual in a deal valuing Rothesay Life at around £2bn; 
http://www.cityam.com/269996/goldman-sachs-sells-final-stake-2bn-rothesay-life 
122 Solvency II has increased capital requirements and has reduced the attractiveness of 
annuities as a business line for certain insurers and raised buy-out prices by 5-7% 
(Financial News, 28 March–3 April 2016).  
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inadequate return on capital and to transfer that capital to its growing businesses in Asia.123 
Reinsurance deals have also increased in response to Solvency II, involving non-EU reinsurers. 
For example, PIC executed a £1.6bn longevity reinsurance agreement with PICA in June 2016.  
11.45   2016 also witnessed the increasing streamlining and standardization of contracts. This 
is particularly beneficial to small plans below £100m. Previously, smaller plans have been less 
attractive to insurers due to the higher costs of arranging such deals relative to the profit earned. 
To circumvent this, consultants have begun offering services that allow smaller plans to access 
improved pricing and better commercial terms using a standardized off-the-shelf process 
incorporating pre-negotiated legal contracts. Pricing is more competitive because the insurer’s 
costs are kept low. An example is WTW’s Streamlined Bulk Annuity Service. The increasing 
maturity of the market has meant that some larger plans have also been prepared to use pre-
negotiated contracts (Willis Towers Watson, 2017). 
11.46   2016 was also the tenth anniversary of the longevity transfer market. Since its beginning 
in the UK in 2006, £40bn of buy-outs and £31bn of buy-ins have taken place in the UK, 
covering 1 million people.124 Yet this equates to just 5% of the £1.5trn of UK defined benefit 
(DB) pension assets and 3% of the £2.7trn of DB pension liabilities on a buy-out basis. In 
addition, forty eight longevity swaps are known to have been completed in the United Kingdom 
between 2007 and 2016, valued at £75bn and covering 13 insurance companies’ annuity and 
buy-out books, 22 private sector pension funds, and one local authority pension fund (some of 
which executed more than one swap).125 Figure 16 shows the growth of the global market in 
longevity risk transfer between 2007 and 2017. A total of $366bn in transactions have been 
completed during this period.  
11.47   At the beginning of 2017, there were eight UK-domiciled insurers actively participating 
in the pension risk transfer market in the UK. The largest players are PIC and Legal & General, 
with market shares of 37% and 30%, respectively. The others are Rothesay Life, Canada Life, 
Zurich, Scottish Widows, Standard Life, and new entrant Phoenix (since August). 
Occasionally, the insurers co-operate in a transaction. To illustrate, in August 2017, L&G 
executed a longevity swap in respect of £800m of the pension liabilities of Scottish and 
Southern Energy (SSE), while PIC completed a £350m buy-in for the company. Consultant 
LCP estimated that £12bn buy-ins and buy-outs took place in 2017 and predicts that £15bn will 
take place in 2018, with total insurer capacity at £25bn: ‘There remains significant capacity 
and competition – even if a large back-book comes to market – providing attractive 
opportunities for pension plans to transfer longevity risk through a buy-in or buy-out’.126  
 
 
                                                 
123 https://www.ftadviser.com/pensions/2016/12/05/prudential-seeks-buyers-for-45bn-
annuity-business/ 
124 LCP, Professional Pensions (15 December 2016 and 26 January 2017). Since 2007, 
some 92 buy-ins have been completed – see Table A1. 
125 www.artemis.bm/library/longevity_swaps_risk_transfers.html; see Table A2 for a full 
list of UK publicly announced longevity swaps between 2007 and 2016. 
126 https://www.lcp.uk.com/media-centre/press-releases/2017/08/buy-in-and-buy-out-
volumes-nearly-double; LCP (2018) Pension De-risking 2018.  
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Figure 16:  Cumulative Pension Risk Transfers by Product and Country, 2007-17 
 
 
      Sources: LIMRA, Hymans Robertson, LCP and PFI analysis as of December 31, 2017 
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11.48  One of the largest deals in 2017 (September) involved a £3.4bn longevity swap between 
the Marsh & McLennan Companies (MMC) UK Pension Fund and both Canada Life 
Reinsurance and PICA, using Guernsey-based incorporated cell companies, Fission Alpha IC 
Limited and Fission Beta IC Limited. MMC subsidiary Mercer led the transaction as adviser 
to the pension fund trustee and the deal was the first to be completed using the Mercer Marsh 
longevity captive solution, with no upfront premium. The two reinsurers shared the risk equally 
and the use of the captive ICC vehicle meant that no insurer intermediary was required, making 
the deal more cost-effective for the pension fund.127 Also in September, the British Airways’ 
Airways Pension Scheme used a similar Guernsey-based captive insurer to set up a £1.6bn 
longevity swap. The longevity risk was then reinsured with Partner Re and Canada Life Re. 
The scheme had previously hedged £2.6bn of liabilities through two longevity swap 
transactions executed by Rothesay Life in 2010 and 2011.128  In November 2017, PIC executed 
a £900m longevity swap with PICA, while in December 2017, L&G executed a £600m 
longevity swap with PICA.129 
11.49   In December 2017, NN Life, part of the Nationale-Nederlanden Group, executed an 
index-based longevity hedge with reinsurer Hannover Re, in a deal covering the insurer against 
the longevity trend risk in €3bn of its liabilities. The structure is similar to the 2013 Aegon tail-
risk deal arranged by Société Générale (SG) and builds on subsequent work including 
Michaelson and Mulholland (2015) and Cairns and El Boukfaoui (2018). While the term of the 
transaction is 20 years, NN Life is protected over a longer time period via a commutation 
function130 that applies at maturity. If longevity improvements have been much stronger than 
expected, this will be assumed to continue until the liabilities run-off and NN will receive a 
payment under the hedge. The transaction helped to reduce the solvency capital requirement of 
NN’s Netherlands life business by €35m. The index attachment point for the hedge is close to 
NN’s best estimate, which helps maintain the SCR relief and effective risk transfer over 
time.131, 132    
 
11.50   In April 2015, the UK government introduced ‘freedom and choice’ pension reforms 
which gave more flexibility to how individuals could draw down their defined contribution 
pension pots. In particular, there was no longer a requirement to purchase an annuity.133 This 
immediately led to a fall in annuity sales by more than 50%. The situation was not helped by 
the fall in gilt yields (which led to a corresponding fall in annuity rates) arising from the 
government’s quantitative easing programme introduced after the GFC. In August 2017, a 65-
year old with a £100,000 pension pot, could get a level income for life of £4,894: two years 
                                                 
127http://www.artemis.bm/blog/2017/09/14/mmc-pension-offloads-huge-3-4bn-of-
longevity-risk-to-reinsurers. The counter to this cost-effectiveness is that the hedger takes 
on additional counterparty risk. If a reinsurer fails then there is no insurer to protect BA's 
pension scheme.  
128 Nick Reeve (2017) BA scheme uses ‘captive insurer’ in £1.6bn longevity risk hedge, 
IPE, 13 September. 
129 https://www.pensioncorporation.com/media/press-releases/Prudential, PIC Reach 
$1.2 Billion Longevity Reinsurance Agreement; L&G reinsures £600m of longevity risk 
through Prudential, Professional Pensions, 21 December 2017. 
130 See paragraph 5.5.5. 
131 http://www.artemis.bm/blog/2017/12/01/nn-life-gets-index-based-longevity-hedge-
from-hannover-re/ 
132 https://www.nn-group.com/Investors/Capital-Markets-Day-2017.htm 
133https://www.pensionsadvisoryservice.org.uk/about-pensions/pension-
reform/freedom-and-choice 
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before, the amount would have been £5,292.134 By 2017, the following insurers had pulled out 
of the open market for annuities: Aegon, LV=, Partnership (before it merged with Just 
Retirement to form Just), Prudential, Standard Life, Friends Life (merged with Aviva), 
Reliance Mutual, B&CE, and Retirement Advantage. This leaves just six providers left in what 
was once the world’s largest annuity market: Aviva (offering standard and enhanced annuities), 
Canada Life (standard and enhanced), Hodge Lifetime (standard only), Just (enhanced only), 
Legal & General (standard and enhanced) and Scottish Widows (standard only).135 
 
11.51   In order to reduce the costs of de-risking, pension plans are encouraged to perform some 
liability reduction exercises, the key ones being:136 
• Enhanced transfer values (ETVs) – allow deferred members to transfer an uplifted value 
of their benefits to an alternative arrangement. In August 2017, a 64-year old entitled 
to an index-linked pension starting at £10,000 from age 65 would be offered a transfer 
value of £237,000, according to the Xafinity Tranfer Value Index.137 
• Flexible retirement options (FROs) – allow deferred members aged 55 and over to retire 
early, or to take a transfer value and secure benefits in a different format from their plan 
benefits, or to use funds for drawdown purposes. 
• Pension increase exchanges (PIEs) – allow pensioners to exchange non-statutory 
increases for a higher immediate pension with lower or even zero future increases (e.g., 
a £10,000 annual pension with RPI uplifting is replaced by a £12,000 annual pension 
with no further increases). 
• Trivial commutations (TCs) – allow members with low value benefits to cash these in. 
The most common exercises currently in the UK are PIEs and TCs – and these can be conducted 
either before or at the same time as a bulk purchase annuity broking exercise.   
 
11.52   Innovation is a continuing feature of this market. Some examples include (see, e.g., 
Legal & General and Engaged Investor, 2016): 
• Buy-ins and buy-outs with deferred premium payments – to spread costs. 
• Phased de-risking using a sequence of partial buy-ins with an ‘umbrella’ structure to 
avoid more than one set of contract negotiations – to spread costs. 
• Accelerated buy-ins – the insurer provides a loan to the plan equal to the deficit 
(sometimes called a winding up lump sum (WULS)), so that a partial buy-in can take 
place immediately, with this converting to a full buy-in when the loan has been repaid, 
with the option of a full buy-out at a later date. 
• Forward start buy-ins – a standard buy-in with the start date delayed to reflect the level 
of funding available, with additional options, such as paying deferred members as and 
when they retire if this is prior to the start date, or the ability to bring forward the start 
date for an additional fee. 
• Automated bulk plan transfers – to reduce risks (introduced in November 2017 by 
Scottish Widows and Standard Life).138 
• Top-slice buy-ins – to target the highest value liabilities. 
                                                 
134 Josephine Cumbo, Pensioners hit as annuity rates drop 10% in two years, Financial 
Times, 1 September. 
135 Source: Hargreaves Lansdown, August 2017. 
136 Professional Pensions (2016) Risk Reduction and the Extent of Trust in Pension Scheme 
Advisers and Providers, June, p.26. 
137 Hannah Godfrey (2017) DB transfer values back on the rise in August, Professional 
Adviser, 7 September. 
138 Michael Klimes (2017) How the first automated bulk scheme transfers happened, 
Professional Pensions, 10 November. 
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• Named-life longevity swap – if the named member lives longer than expected, the 
insurer pays out the difference (examples being the £400m Bentley plan or an unnamed 
plan with 90 named pensioners valued at £50m). 
• Tranching by age – to reduce costs; according to consultant Punter Southall, a buy-in 
for pensioners up to age 70 will make a subsequent buy-out within the following 10 
years cheaper than a buy-in for the over 70s.139 
• Longevity swaps for small pension plans with liabilities of £50-100m – previously only 
available for medium (£100-500m) and large plans (above £500m). 
• Novation – the ability to transfer a longevity hedge from one provider to another, 
thereby introducing some liquidity into what had previously been a completely illiquid 
market. An example would be the reinsurance of a small bulk annuity transaction. 
Contract simplicity is a desirable feature of such arrangements. 
• Longevity swap to buy-in conversions – as pioneered by Phoenix Life in December 
2016 for its parent company’s pension plan. Solvency II incentivizes buy-in providers 
to hold longevity insurance, otherwise they pay an additional risk margin.  This 
encourages buy-in providers to seek out plans which already have a longevity hedge 
and encourage them to do a buy-in. Another driver is longevity swap providers that are 
not currently active in the market – such as J.P. Morgan and Credit Suisse – but are still 
responsible for running off their existing swaps. They might have an incentive to 
encourage the associated pension plan to novate the swap to a buy-in provider and 
hence extinguish their liability.140 
• Insuring away the extreme tail of liabilities in a closed plan after a specified term, such 
as 5 or 10 years – to reduce costs. 
• Increasing optionality in contracts to improve flexibility – for example, the option to 
switch the indexation measure for pensions in payment from the Retail Price Index to 
the Consumer Price Index if government legislation changes; or the option to secure 
discretionary benefits, such as actual inflation above a 5% cap; or surrender options. 
• Combining liability management solutions (such as interest rate and inflation swaps, 
and ETV, FRO and PIE exercises) and bulk annuities in a buy-out – so instead of 
completing liability management before considering a buy-out, plans do this in a single 
exercise. 
• ‘Buy-out aware’ investment portfolios – used to reduce buy-out price volatility and 
close the funding shortfall, with the buy-out price locked to the value of the buy-out 
aware funds once a target shortfall has been reached and whilst the contract 
documentation for a buy-out is being completed. 
• Improved arrangements for handling data errors that arise after a deal has been executed 
– to reduce pre-deal negotiation requirements and post-deal transaction uncertainty. 
Common data errors include member gender, date of birth, and benefit amounts for 
both member and partner. A simplified data error process could deal with these issues 
in the following way: locking down benefits, removing the need for re-pricing; 
mechanistically adjusting demographic errors; and using due diligence to check for 
systematic errors with the data.141 
                                                 
139 James Phillips (2017) DB schemes insuring wrong tranche of members in buy-ins, 
Professional Pensions, 14 August. 
140 Stephanie Baxter (2017) Converting longevity swaps into bulk annuities: The next de-
risking innovation?, Professional Pensions, 13 April. 
141 Andrew Murphy (2017) Developments in longevity swaps, Pacific Life Re, 23 November, 
IFoA Life Conference.  Provided due diligence has been carried out at the outset, 
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• Arrangements to handle deferred members – to improve insurer appetite to assume the 
additional risk and cost involved. Deferred lives make up almost half (45%) of the 
membership of UK defined benefit plans in the UK.142 They are much more expensive 
to hedge for a number of reasons. First, there can be problems with their existence and 
identification. Second, they enjoy a large number of options which need to be priced.143 
Third, their longevity risk is greater, because the longevity improvement assumption 
used for pricing has greater reliance on the assumed long-run trend.144 Fourth, as a 
direct consequence of the previous points, more capital is needed and this, in turn, 
increases the demand for reinsurance. These issues can be at least partially mitigated as 
follows: a robust existence checking procedure is needed involving electronic tracing, 
assuming a fixed percentage of the pension is exchanged for tax-free cash, setting the 
assumed retirement date to the plan’s normal retirement date, assuming no pension is 
exchanged for additional partner pension, restricting the age profile to older deferred 
members, and restricting the proportion of deferred members in the transaction.145 
 
11.53   These are all innovations in the space linking pension plans and insurance companies 
designed to ease the transfer of pension liabilities (or at least the longevity risk in them) from 
pension plans to insurance companies. But there is now an increasing sign of long-term 
capacity constraints within insurance companies.146 As one consultant said: ‘Given the market 
has historically completed only 150-200 deals in any one year, there is a real risk of capacity 
constraints in the market, not just from an insurer capital perspective, but also from a resource 
and expertise perspective’.147  
 
11.54   In April 2017, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) released a new edition of its 
Global Financial Stability Report. Chapter 2 (‘Low Growth, Low Interest Rates, And Financial 
Intermediation’) suggests that DB pension funds across the globe might have to cut benefits 
‘significantly’ in the long term because of ultra-low interest rates. Attempts to increase returns 
by changing asset allocations ‘appears feasible only by taking potentially unacceptable levels 
of risk’. In the face of such low rates, the IMF argues that ‘life insurers and pension funds 
would face a long-lasting transitional challenge to profitability and solvency, which is likely to 
require additional capital’ or would require a ‘very high’ level of volatility risk to meet their 
                                                 
subsequent data errors tend to be unbiased in terms of their impact and so average out 
close to zero. 
142 That is 4.9m members (The Pension Regulator and the Pension Protection Fund, Purple 
Book 2015). 
143 For example, lump sum commutation, trivial commutation, early/late retirement, 
increasing a partner’s benefits at the expense of the member’s benefits, and pension 
increase exchanges. 
144 Valuation and risk assessment of a deferred annuity can be broken down into five 
overlapping components: survival to retirement; the socio-economic group of the 
pensioner at the date of retirement; the base mortality table at the time of retirement for 
that socio-economic group; general mortality improvements (e.g., age 65+) up to the date 
of retirement; and the mortality improvement rate after retirement. Uncertainty in the 
probability of survival to retirement will typically be quite small in relation to the other 
risks. 
145 Andrew Murphy (2017) Developments in longevity swaps, Pacific Life Re, 23 November, 
IFoA Life Conference. 
146 As mentioned in paragraph 11.47, there does not appear to be an immediate capacity 
constraint.   
147 Martyn Phillips, Mercer (quoted in Professional Pensions (2016) Risk Reduction and the 
Extent of Trust in Pension Scheme Advisers and Providers, June, p.28). 
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funding goals. However, a combination of risk aversion and regulatory constraints was likely 
to deter the vast majority from taking this second path. The IMF instead believes that the 
current situation might work to the benefit of insurers backing buy-ins and buy-outs. With 
investors increasingly monitoring the size of DB liabilities and the effects on company share 
prices, profits, and dividends, the IMF said offloading these liabilities to insurers ‘is an 
attractive option’ and ‘may represent a market-efficient arrangement’ and that ‘regulation could 
play an important role in this area by facilitating such transactions’. 
 
12.  A LOOK INTO THE FUTURE: POTENTIAL LONGEVITY RISK TRANSFER SOLUTIONS  
12.1 Overview 
A number of potential solutions were suggested in the 2006 Living with Mortality paper: 
• Longevity bond types (e.g., zero-coupon longevity bonds, deferred longevity bonds, 
principal-at-risk longevity bonds and longevity spread bonds). 
• Mortality, longevity and annuity futures.  
• Mortality options, longevity caplets and floorlets. 
• Mortality swaptions. 
These were direct translations from already exiting capital market instruments, but so far none 
of these, apart from a single longevity spread bond (i.e., Kortis), have been introduced in the 
longevity risk transfer market.  In this section, we look at two potential new solutions that might 
have a greater chance of being introduced in the near term. 
12.2 Potential New Solution: Longevity-linked Securities 
12.2.1   A perceived problem with the EIB/BNP Paribas longevity bond was that the reference 
index might not be sufficiently highly correlated with a hedger’s own mortality experience (as 
a result of population basis risk). An alternative instrument – denoted a longevity-linked 
security (LLS)148 – deals, at least partly, with this problem. The concept was inspired by the 
design of mortgage-backed securities.  
 
12.2.2   The LLS is built around a special purpose vehicle. Individual hedgers on one side of 
the contract (for example, a pension plan or an annuity provider) arrange longevity swaps with 
the SPV using their own mortality experience at rates that are negotiated with the SPV manager. 
The swapped cashflows are then aggregated and passed on to the market. Bondholders gain if 
mortality is heavier than anticipated. 
 
12.2.3   It might be felt that the aggregate cashflows themselves lack transparency149  in which 
case the SPV might link cashflows to an accepted reference index. The difference between this 
and the aggregated swap cashflows is a basis risk that is borne by the SPV manager. 
 
12.2.4   This type of arrangement is illustrated in Figure 17 where the intermediary in this case 
is a reinsurer which transacts customized longevity swaps with a set of hedgers. In this 
example, there are three hedgers, A, B, and C (but there could, of course, be many more). 
Hedger A wishes to swap the risky longevity-linked cashflows 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡) for a series of pre-
determined cashflows. The agreement with the SPV manager is to swap floating 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡) for fixed 
𝐿𝐿�𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡) for 𝑡𝑡 = 1,⋯ ,𝑇𝑇, with the fixed leg set at a level that results in the swap initially having 
zero value at time 0. Similarly, hedger B swaps floating 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵(𝑡𝑡) for fixed 𝐿𝐿�𝐵𝐵(𝑡𝑡), and hedger C 
                                                 
148 These were first discussed in Cairns et al. (2008). 
149 Although this did not seem to be a problem with mortgage-backed securities until the 
emergence of the GFC in 2007. 
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floating 𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡) for fixed 𝐿𝐿�𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡). The SPV itself invests in AAA-rated, fixed-interest securities 
of appropriate duration or uses floating rate notes plus an interest-rate swap.  
 
Figure 17: Cash Flows under a Longevity-Linked Security (LLS)  
 
 
 
 
12.2.5   The LLS bond holders pay an initial premium that is used to buy the fixed-interest 
securities and to pay an initial commission to the SPV manager. The bond holders in return 
receive coupons and, possibly, a final repayment of principal that is linked to a reference index, 
𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡), that matches150 as closely as possible the combined cashflows, rather than to 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡), 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵(𝑡𝑡) 
or 𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡). Any differences accrue to or are paid by the SPV manager. The bond holders will not 
normally be hedgers themselves, so they will expect a fair premium over market fixed-interest 
rates in return for assuming the longevity risk. 
 
  
                                                 
150 The match might be expressed in cashflow terms or in value terms. In the latter case, 
the value of 𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡), is intended to hedge the value of the liability at a specified maturity. 
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12.2.6   Finally, the LLS might take the form of a catastrophe (or cat) bond (similar to the 
Kortis bond). In this case, the repayment of principal would be determined by the value of an 
index-based underlying, with appropriate attachment and exhaustion points. 
 
12.2.7   To be more concrete, the underlying index 𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡) that the LLS makes reference to is 
derived from, e.g., national population mortality rates, and is constructed in a way to achieve 
the optimal balance between hedge effectiveness for the reinsurer within the cat bond structure, 
and the risk-return profile to investors. For a cat bond with attachment and exhaustion points 
AP and EP, the payoff at maturity will be the full bond nominal, N,  if 𝑋𝑋(𝑇𝑇) < 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃, 
𝑁𝑁�1− (𝑋𝑋(𝑇𝑇)− 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃)/(𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃 − 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃)� if 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃 ≤ 𝑋𝑋(𝑇𝑇) < 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃, and 0 if 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃 ≤ 𝑋𝑋(𝑇𝑇). 
 
12.2.8   The hedge is most likely to be effective if the reinsurer takes on a balanced and well 
diversified group of transactions with the primary hedgers (A, B and C above). For example, 
if the primary reinsurance transactions are wholly with blue collar pension plans, then an index-
based LLS will be much less effective for the reinsurer. A low level of population basis risk 
turns out not to require exact matching of the national population (e.g., the aggregation of A, 
B and C). For example, Cairns et al. (2017a) demonstrate that an aggregated portfolio that 
covers 80% of the population but is also heavily skewed in value terms towards wealthier and 
healthier people can have a correlation with the national population that is well above 95%.  
 
12.2.9   The marketing of LLS to ILS investors has great potential, following the introduction 
of comprehensive UK regulations for ILS in 2017, particularly if it takes the cat bond structure 
familiar to such investors, according to consultants Hymans Robertson. This is because 
longevity risk is becoming better understood and its volatility and correlation with other asset 
classes is low. Hymans Robertson argues that ‘Bulk annuity insurers could use [ILS] to provide 
additional capital to finance large deals (particularly where reinsurance is expensive or difficult 
to obtain) or to optimize their capital positions by rebalancing the risks on their balance sheets’. 
With the ILS investor base broadening all the time and an increasing amount of capital flowing 
into the market from other sophisticated investor sources, there is a growing pool of capital for 
which longevity or bulk-annuity linked risks might be attractive.151 
12.3 Potential New Solution: Reinsurance Sidecars 
12.3.1   Another potential solution is the reinsurance sidecar – which is a way to share risks 
with new investors when the latter are concerned about the ceding reinsurer having an 
informational advantage. 
 
12.3.2   Formally, a reinsurance sidecar is a financial structure established to allow external 
investors to take on the risk and benefit from the return of specific books of insurance or 
reinsurance business. It is typically set up by existing (re)insurers that are looking to either 
partner with another source of capital or set up an entity to enable them to accept capital from 
third-party investors (Kessler et al., 2016). 
 
12.3.3   It is established as a SPV, with a maturity of 2-3 years. It is capitalized by specialist 
insurance funds, usually by preference shares, though sometimes in the form of debt 
instruments. It reinsures a defined pre-agreed book of business or categories of risk. Liability 
is limited to assets of the SPV and the vehicle is unrated. 
                                                 
151 Artemis (2017) ILS has potential in UK longevity and backing annuity deals: Hymans 
Robertson;www.artemis.bm/BLOG/2017/08/21/ILS-HAS-POTENTIAL-IN-UK-LONGEVITY-
BACKING-ANNUITY-DEALS-HYMANS-ROBERTSON/ 
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12.3.4   The benefit to insurers is that sidecars can provide protection against exposure to peak 
longevity risks152, help with capital management by providing additional capacity without the 
need for permanent capital, and can provide an additional source of income by leveraging 
underwriting expertise. The benefit to investors is that they enjoy targeted non-correlated 
returns relating to specific short-horizon risks and have an agreed procedure for exiting; 
investors can also take advantage of temporary price hikes, but without facing legacy issues 
that could affect an investment in a typical insurer. 
 
12.3.5   Figure 18 shows a typical sidecar structure. 
 
Figure 18: Typical Sidecar Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: PFI 
 
12.3.6   There are a number of challenges to the use of sidecars in the longevity risk transfer 
market. There is the tension between the long-term nature of longevity risk and investor 
preference for a short-term investment horizon. There are also regulatory requirements on 
cedants, affecting their ability to generate a return. These include: the posting of prudent 
collateral, the underlying assets in the SPV must generate matching cash flows, the risk transfer 
must be genuine, and the custodian/trustee must be financially strong. There is also a risk to 
cedants of losing capital relief if regulatory requirements are not met or they change. 
12.4   Why Could These Potential Solutions Be Successful Now? 
The principal reason why these solutions might be more successful now in a way that they were 
not a decade ago is the capacity constraint in the (re)insurance industry – it does not have the 
capital or experienced personnel to take on unlimited longevity risk. The only long-term 
solution to this capacity constraint is to bring in new investors from the capital markets (i.e., to 
transfer the risk to the capital markets). These investors will include ILS investors, hedge funds, 
private equity investors, sovereign wealth funds, endowments, family offices and other 
investors seeking asset classes that have low correlation with existing financial assets. 
However, two issues need to be resolved. First, the hedger needs assurance that the solution 
sold to these investors provides an effective hedge. Second, these investors need some 
assurance that they are not going to be sold a ‘lemon’.153 There have been many attempts over 
                                                 
152 That is, specific individual cashflows that give rise to the greatest uncertainty in value 
terms 
153 Originally a ‘lemon’ was a defective second-hand car offered for sale on an ‘as good as 
new’ basis. It now refers to any product where the seller has more information about its 
true worth than any potential buyer. In other words, the seller has an informational 
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the last decade to provide both types of assurance – without any real success. This time it might 
be – and certainly needs to be – different. An early sign of success for the reinsurance sidecar 
structure came at the beginning of 2018 when RGA Re and RenaissanceRe, announced a new 
start-up named Langhorne Re, which will target in-force life and annuity business. The new 
company has secured $780m of equity capital from RGA, RenaissanceRe and third-party 
sidecar investors, including pension funds and other life companies.154 
 
13.  CONCLUSIONS  
 
13.1   As Michaelson and Mulholland (2015, P.29-30) point out: 
the longevity risk inherent in the world’s aggregate retirement obligations is far in 
excess of the amount of risk capital the global insurance industry could realistically 
bring to bear against this risk.155 Seen in this light, it becomes painfully obvious that 
vast sums of additional risk capital must be dedicated to adequately managing 
longevity risk. It is similarly evident that the only source capable of providing such 
quantities of capital, and thus assuming a meaningful amount of the world’s longevity 
risk, are the global capital markets…. The mission is clear – longevity risk must be 
successfully turned into an asset class capable of attracting these vast pools of capital, 
or else the world’s retirement systems will struggle to significantly reduce their 
longevity exposures in an efficient manner. However, developing capital markets 
solutions that are readily acceptable by a wide spectrum of institutional investors – 
given the complexity and uncertainty in modelling this long-term risk – requires 
innovative solutions from dedicated and experienced financial institutions.  
 
There are four major challenges. 
 
13.2   First, in order to expand the investor base, there is a need to close the gap between the 
preferences of stakeholders: buyers and sellers of longevity protection. Currently, long-term 
capital-market investors prefer bonds, while, as the paper has outlined, the most successful 
solutions have been longevity swaps. While short-term mortality bonds have been a success, 
long-term longevity bonds have not been similarly successful so far. So more creative 
approaches that develop a carefully structured risk management chain are needed to meet the 
differing requirements and risk appetites of stakeholders. However, the Swiss Re strategy of 
gradual iteration from a successful innovation – as exemplified in the Kortis longevity spread 
bond which was a modest adaptation of the Vita mortality bond in terms of design and maturity 
– appears to show a way forward, as do elements of the recent NN Life transaction in the 
Netherlands. The two key prizes, if successful, are a much bigger investor base and much 
greater market liquidity.  
 
13.3  Second, there needs to be a common agreement between market participants on which 
mortality model to use for the design and pricing of each longevity-linked deal. One of the 
main reasons why Aegon’s deal with Société Générale went ahead in 2013 was that all parties 
                                                 
advantage and needs to find a way of demonstrating the true value to the potential buyer 
in order to secure a sale (see Akerlof, 1970). The most effective way of achieving this for 
the reinsurer is to ‘keep some skin in the game’ by agreeing to co-share downside risks 
with the new sidecar investors (as explained in Biffis and Blake, 2014). 
154 https://www.reinsurancene.ws/langhorne-re-launched-rga-renre-force-life-annuity-
reinsurer/ 
155 Total global reinsurer capital was just $595bn at 31 December 2016 (Aon Benfield, 
Reinsurance Market Outlook April 2017).  
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agreed to use the same mortality model. Even if a mortality model produces the wrong forecasts 
– which it is bound to do – as long as those forecasts are not systematically biased, then it 
becomes a potential candidate for use in this market. 
 
13.4   Third, a number of operational issues need to be dealt with. These include basis risk, 
credit risk, collateral and liquidity. Not only will this require market participants to work out 
the optimal trade-offs between basis risk and liquidity and between credit risk and collateral, it 
will also require the regulator to be willing to grant fair levels of regulatory capital relief for 
index-based hedge solutions that are compatible with current solvency capital requirements 
and consistent with levels of capital relief for customized longevity hedges, thereby putting 
both types of hedge on a level footing. 
 
13.5   Fourth, it is important to engage with the regulator. This was the key message of Richard 
Sandor, a serial starter of new markets, such as the financial futures, climate exchange and 
Ameribor markets,156 when he spoke at the Longevity 12 conference in September 2016.157 He 
said that he always worked closely with the regulator when he was introducing a new product 
or market, so that there would be no surprises on the launch date. Failure to do this in the case 
of some of the early Dutch tail-risk protection deals meant that the Dutch regulator did not give 
the capital relief that was anticipated at the design stage. Regulators can also have big 
unintended consequences if, instead of engaging with them, there are attempts to circumvent 
them. For example, regulatory responses to the Global Financial Crisis (such as the US Dodd-
Frank Act) had a significant effect in slowing down the establishment of longevity-linked 
capital market securities – which had nothing to do with the crisis itself. Regulations restricting 
the risk-taking activities of investment banks and new bank capital rules (Basel III) severely 
limited the role that banks could play in the development of this market. For example, it became 
virtually impossible for them to warehouse risk while matching longevity hedgers and 
longevity investors; and it even became unattractive for them to intermediate, standing in the 
middle between hedgers and investors, because the long-dated, illiquid credit exposure 
associated with longevity transactions now carried increased capital requirements.158 While 
significant parts of the Dodd-Frank Act are in the process of being repealed, there is little sign 
that investment banks – the traditional conduit for introducing new capital from global 
investors, such as sovereign wealth funds – are returning to the longevity risk market. 
 
13.6   These four challenges will need to be addressed in the next stage of the development of 
this market. But innovation has been an important feature of the longevity market since 2006 
and there is every reason to believe that this will continue as the different players in the industry 
seek to meet the growing demand for longevity risk transfers, while reducing costs, optimizing 
capital and managing risks. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1 lists UK pension buy-ins over £100m between 2007-2016, while Table A2 lists the 
publicly announced longevity swaps that have been executed between 2007 and 2016 in the 
UK. 
 
TABLE A1: UK PENSION BUY-INS OVER £100M, 2007-2016 
Hedger Name Size 
(£m) 
Sector Insurer Date 
Aggregate Industries 305 Mining Pension Insurance 
Corporation 
Feb 
10 
Aggregate Industries 135 Mining Just Retirement 
Partnership 
Jul 16 
Aon 150 Financial Services MetLife (now 
Rothesay Life) 
Jun 
09 
Aon  105 Financial Services Pension Insurance 
Corporation 
Mar 
12 
Aon 210 Financial Services Pension Insurance 
Corporation 
Oct 
14 
Aon 890 Financial services Pension Insurance 
Corporation 
Mar 
16 
BBA Aviation 270 Aviation Legal & General Apr 
08 
Cable & Wireless 1,050 Communications Prudential Sep 
08 
Cadbury 500 Food Producer Pension Insurance 
Corporation 
Dec 
09 
CDC 370 Public Rothesay Life  Nov 
09 
Civil Aviation Authority 1,600 Public Rothesay Life  Jul 15 
Cobham 280 Aerospace & 
Defence 
Rothesay Life  Jul 13 
Cookson 320 Engineering Pension Insurance 
Corporation 
Jul 12 
Dairy Crest 150 Food Producer Legal & General Dec 
08 
Dairy Crest 150 Food Producer Legal & General Jun 
09 
Friends Provident 360 Financial Services Aviva Apr 
08 
GKN 125 Engineering Rothesay Life  Jan 
14 
GKN 190 Engineering Pension Insurance 
Corporation 
Nov 
16 
GlaxoSmithKline 900 Pharmaceutical Prudential Nov 
10 
Home Retail Group 280 Retail Prudential Jun 
11 
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TABLE A1: UK PENSION BUY-INS OVER £100M, 2007-2016 
Hedger Name Size 
(£m) 
Sector Insurer Date 
Hunting 110 Energy Paternoster (now 
Rothesay Life) 
Jan 
07 
ICI 3,000 Chemicals Legal & General Mar 
14 
ICI 600 Chemicals Prudential Mar 
14 
ICI 300 Chemicals Prudential Nov 
14 
ICI 500 Chemicals Legal & General Mar 
15 
ICI 500 Chemicals Prudential Jun 
15 
ICI 500 Chemicals Legal & General Jun 
15 
ICI 330 Chemicals Legal & General Mar 
16 
ICI 630 Chemicals Scottish Widows Jun 
16 
ICI 750 Chemicals Legal & General Jul 16 
ICI 590 Chemicals Scottish Widows Sep 
16 
ICI 380 Chemicals Legal & General Sep 
16 
ICI Specialty Chemicals 220 Chemicals Prudential Aug 
15 
ICI Specialty Chemicals 140 Chemicals Pension Insurance 
Corporation 
Nov 
16 
Interserve 300 Construction Aviva Jul 14 
JLT 120 Financial Services Prudential Sep 
13 
Kingfisher 230 Retail Legal & General Dec 
15 
London Stock Exchange 160 Financial Services Pension Insurance 
Corporation 
May 
11 
Meat & Livestock 
Commission 
150 Food Producer Aviva Jun 
11 
MNOPF 500 Shipping Lucida (now Legal 
& General) 
Sep 
09 
MNOPF 100 Various Lucida (now Legal 
& General) 
May 
10 
Morgan Crucible 160 Engineering Lucida (now Legal 
& General) 
Mar 
08 
Next 125 Retail Aviva Aug 
10 
Northern Bank 680 Financial Services Prudential Apr 
15 
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TABLE A1: UK PENSION BUY-INS OVER £100M, 2007-2016 
Hedger Name Size 
(£m) 
Sector Insurer Date 
Ofcom 150 Public Legal & General Jul 08 
P&O 800 UK Ports Business Paternoster (now 
Rothesay Life) 
Dec 
07 
Pensions Trust 225 Charities Paternoster (now 
Rothesay Life) 
Jul 08 
Philips 480 Technology Rothesay Life  Aug 
13 
Philips 300 Technology Prudential Jun 
14 
Philips 310 Technology Prudential Sep 
14 
Pilkington 230 Manufacturing Pension Insurance 
Corporation 
Aug 
16 
Smith & Nephew 190 Medical Rothesay Life  Jan 
13 
Smiths Group 250 Engineering Legal & General Mar 
08 
Smiths Group 250 Engineering Paternoster (now 
Rothesay Life) 
Sep 
08 
Smiths Group 150 Engineering Rothesay Life  Sep 
11 
Smiths Group 170 Engineering Pension Insurance 
Corporation 
Sep 
13 
Smiths Group 250 Engineering Pension Insurance 
Corporation 
Oct 
16 
Tate & Lyle 350 Food Producer Legal & General Dec 
12 
Taylor Wimpey 205 Housebuilding Partnership Dec 
14 
The Church of England 100 Charities Prudential Feb 
14 
Total 1,600 Oil and Gas Pension Insurance 
Corporation 
Jun 
14 
Undisclosed 145 Undisclosed Legal & General Jan 
09 
Undisclosed 220 Retail Legal & General Mar 
09 
Undisclosed 100 Manufacturing MetLife (now 
Rothesay Life) 
Jan 
10 
Undisclosed 100 Retail Aviva Mar 
10 
Undisclosed 185 Banking Aviva Dec 
10 
Undisclosed 120 Undisclosed Legal & General May 
11 
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TABLE A1: UK PENSION BUY-INS OVER £100M, 2007-2016 
Hedger Name Size 
(£m) 
Sector Insurer Date 
Undisclosed 145 Property MetLife (now 
Rothesay Life) 
Nov 
11 
Undisclosed 250 Media Aviva Dec 
11 
Undisclosed 110 Undisclosed Aviva Dec 
11 
Undisclosed 250 Undisclosed Legal & General Aug 
12 
Undisclosed 140 Undisclosed Prudential Aug 
12 
Undisclosed 120 Undisclosed Pension Insurance 
Corporation 
Nov 
12 
Undisclosed 100 Undisclosed Pension Insurance 
Corporation 
Dec 
12 
Undisclosed 100 Undisclosed Pension Insurance 
Corporation 
Apr 
13 
Undisclosed 200 Undisclosed Pension Insurance 
Corporation 
Nov 
14 
Undisclosed 300 Unknown Aviva Jun 
15 
Undisclosed 120 Undisclosed Just Retirement Oct 
15 
Undisclosed 200 Undisclosed Scottish Widows Apr 
16 
Undisclosed 130 Undisclosed Just Retirement 
Partnership 
Jul 16 
Undisclosed 150 Undisclosed Pension Insurance 
Corporation 
Sep 
16 
Undisclosed 100 Undisclosed Pension Insurance 
Corporation 
Sep 
16 
Undisclosed 245 Unknown Pension Insurance 
Corporation 
Nov 
16 
Undisclosed 105 Undisclosed Pension Insurance 
Corporation 
Nov 
16 
Undisclosed* 120 Undisclosed Rothesay Life  Jun 
14 
Unilever 130 Consumer goods Legal & General Sep 
14 
Weir Group 240 Engineering Legal & General Dec 
07 
West Ferry Printers 130 Printing Aviva Sep 
08 
West Midlands Integrated 
Transport Authority 
270 Transport Prudential Apr 
12 
Western United 115 Mining Rothesay Life  Nov 
12 
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TABLE A1: UK PENSION BUY-INS OVER £100M, 2007-2016 
Hedger Name Size 
(£m) 
Sector Insurer Date 
Western United 110 Food Producer Rothesay Life  Mar 
14 
Wiggins Teape 400 Manufacturing Scottish Widows Nov 
15 
Source: LCP (Professional Pensions, 26 January 2017) 
Notes: Information collected from insurance company data and publicly announced transactions in 
H2 2016. Notes: * This deal was completed during Q3 2014 
 
 
 
TABLE A2: UK LONGEVITY SWAPS, 2007-2017 
Date Hedger Type Size 
(£m) 
Term 
(yrs) 
Format Receiver or 
Intermediary 
April 2007 Friends’ 
Provident 
Ins 1700 Run-off Reinsurance 
contract 
Swiss Re 
Feb 2008 Lucida Ins N/A 10 Index-based 
hedge; 
exposure 
placed with 
capital 
market 
investors 
J. P. Morgan 
Sep 2008 Canada 
Life 
Ins 500 40 Exposure 
placed with 
capital 
market 
investors 
J. P. Morgan 
Feb 2009 Abbey 
Life 
Ins 1500 Run-off Reinsurance 
contract 
Deutsche Bank 
Mar 2009 Aviva Ins 475 10 Exposure 
placed with 
capital 
market 
investors & 
Partner RE 
RBS 
May 2009 Babcock PF 500-750 50 Reinsurance 
contract 
with Pac 
Life Re 
Credit Suisse 
July 2009 RSA Ins 1900 Run-off Reinsurance 
contract 
with 
Rothesay 
Life; 
combined 
with 
inflation & 
interest rate 
swaps 
Goldman 
Sachs/Rothesay 
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TABLE A2: UK LONGEVITY SWAPS, 2007-2017 
Date Hedger Type Size 
(£m) 
Term 
(yrs) 
Format Receiver or 
Intermediary 
Dec 2009 Berkshire 
Council 
PF 1000 Run-off Reinsurance 
contract 
Swiss Re 
Feb 2010 BMW PF 3000 Run-off Reinsurance 
contract 
Deutsche Bank, 
Paternoster 
July 2010 British 
Airways 
PF 1300 NA Synthetic 
buy-in 
(longevity 
swap + 
asset swap) 
Goldman 
Sachs/Rothesay 
Feb 2011 Pall (UK) PF 70 10 Index-based 
hedge; 
exposure 
placed with 
capital 
market 
investors  
J.P.Morgan  
Aug  2011 ITV PF 1700 NA Reinsurance 
contract 
Credit Suisse 
Nov 2011 Rolls 
Royce 
PF 3000 NA Pensioner 
bespoke 
longevity 
swap 
Deutsche Bank 
Dec 2011 British 
Airways 
PF 1300 NA Pensioner 
bespoke 
longevity 
swap 
Goldman 
Sachs/Rothesay 
Dec 2011 Pilkington PF 1000 NA Pensioner 
bespoke 
longevity 
swap 
Legal & 
General 
April 2012 Berkshire 
Council 
PF 100 Run-off Insurance 
contract 
Swiss Re 
May 2012 Akzo 
Nobel 
PF 1400 NA Insurance 
contract 
Swiss Re 
July 2012 Pension 
Insurance 
Corp 
Ins 300 NA Insurance 
contract 
Munich Re 
Dec 2012 LV= Ins 800 NA Insurance 
contract 
Swiss Re 
Dec 2012 Pension 
Insurance 
Corp 
Ins 400 NA Insurance 
contract 
Munich Re 
Feb 2011 Pall (UK) PF 70 10 Index-based 
hedge; 
exposure 
placed with 
capital 
market 
investors  
J.P.Morgan  
Aug  2011 ITV PF 1700 NA Reinsurance 
contract 
Credit Suisse 
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TABLE A2: UK LONGEVITY SWAPS, 2007-2017 
Date Hedger Type Size 
(£m) 
Term 
(yrs) 
Format Receiver or 
Intermediary 
Nov 2011 Rolls 
Royce 
PF 3000 NA Pensioner 
bespoke 
longevity 
swap 
Deutsche Bank 
Dec 2011 British 
Airways 
PF 1300 NA Pensioner 
bespoke 
longevity 
swap 
Goldman 
Sachs/Rothesay 
Dec 2011 Pilkington PF 1000 NA Pensioner 
bespoke 
longevity 
swap 
Legal & 
General 
April 2012 Berkshire 
Council 
PF 100 Run-off Insurance 
contract 
Swiss Re 
May 2012 Akzo 
Nobel 
PF 1400 NA Insurance 
contract 
Swiss Re 
July 2012 Pension 
Insurance 
Corp 
Ins 300 NA Insurance 
contract 
Munich Re 
March 
2014 
Aviva 
Staff 
Pension 
Scheme  
PF 5000 NA Insurance 
contract 
Munich Re, 
Scor and Swiss 
Re 
May 2014 Royal 
London 
Ins 1000 NA Insurance 
contract 
RGA 
International 
July 2014 BT 
Pension 
Scheme 
PF 16000 NA Insurance 
contract 
Prudential 
Insurance Co of 
America 
August 
2014 
Rothesay 
Life 
Ins 1000 NA Insurance 
contract 
Prudential 
Insurance Co of 
America 
August 
2014 
Phoenix 
Group 
Pension 
Scheme 
PF 900 NA Insurance 
contract 
Phoenix Life 
October 
2014 
Legal & 
General 
Ins 1350 NA Insurance 
contract 
Prudential 
Retirement 
Insurance and 
Annuity 
Company 
Dec 2014 Rothesay 
Life 
Ins 1000 NA Insurance 
contract 
Pacific Life Re 
January 
2015 
Rothesay 
Life 
Ins 300 NA Insurance 
contract 
Prudential 
Insurance Co of 
America 
January 
2015 
Merchant 
Navy 
Officers’ 
Pension 
Fund 
PF 1500 NA Insurance 
contract 
Pacific Life Re 
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TABLE A2: UK LONGEVITY SWAPS, 2007-2017 
Date Hedger Type Size 
(£m) 
Term 
(yrs) 
Format Receiver or 
Intermediary 
February 
2015 
Scottish 
Power 
PF 2000 NA Insurance 
contract 
Abbey Life 
April 2015 
and June 
2015 
Pension 
Insurance 
Corp 
Ins >1600 NA Insurance 
contract 
Prudential 
Insurance Co of 
America 
July 2015 AXA UK 
Pension 
Scheme 
PF 2800 NA Insurance 
contract 
RGA 
International 
August 
2015 
Legal & 
General 
Ins 1850 NA Insurance 
contract 
Prudential 
Insurance Co of 
America 
September 
2015 
Scottish & 
Newcastle 
PF 2400 NA Insurance 
contract 
Friends Life, 
Swiss Re 
November 
2015 
RAC 
(2003)  
PF 600 NA Insurance 
contract 
SCOR Se 
December 
2015 
Unnamed  PF 90 NA Insurance 
contract 
Zurich, Pacific 
Life Re 
April 2016 Legal & 
General 
Ins NA NA Reinsurance 
contract 
Prudential 
August 
2016 
Scottish 
Power 
PF 1000 NA Reinsurance 
contract 
Abbey Life 
August 
2016 
Pirelli PF 600 NA Reinsurance 
contract 
Zurich, Pacific 
Life Re 
January 
2017 
NA PF 300 NA Reinsurance 
contract 
Zurich, SCOR 
August 
2017 
SSE PF 800 NA Reinsurance 
contract 
Legal & 
General 
September 
2017 
British 
Airways 
PF 1600 NA Reinsurance 
contract 
Partner Re, 
Canada Life Re 
September 
2017 
Marsh & 
McLennan 
PF 3400 NA Reinsurance 
contract 
Canada Life 
Re, Prudential 
Insurance Co of 
America 
November 
2017 
Pension 
Insurance 
Corp 
Ins 900 NA Reinsurance 
contract 
Prudential 
Insurance Co of 
America 
December 
2017 
Legal & 
General 
Ins 600 NA Reinsurance 
contract 
Prudential 
Insurance Co of 
America 
Note: Ins – hedger is insurance company; PF – hedger is pension fund, 
http://www.artemis.bm/library/longevity_swaps_risk_transfers.html 
 
 
 
